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THE REAL SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY FRAUD(S) 
 
Steven K. Berenson 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 In early January 2014, the Manhattan District Attorney 
announced the indictment of 106 individuals in conjunction with 
one of the largest Social Security Disability fraud scams on 
record.1 Among those indicted included a lawyer,2 a “disability 
consultant” and a small number of facilitators and recruiters, each 
of whom used their experience and professional expertise to 
generate and process the fraudulent claims.3 Those not indicted 
were doctors who generated false medical opinions in support of 
the fraudulent claims.4 The bulk of the fraudulent claimants were 
former New York City police officers and firefighters, many of 
whom also collected disability pensions from the City.5 A large 
number of the claimants alleged that their involvement in 
responding to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks led them to 
suffer from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and other 
mental health problems.6 However, a closer look at the lives the 
claimants actually led belied their claims of disability. Indeed, one 
of the main sources that helped investigators uncover the fraud 
were pictures posted to the claimants’ Facebook pages showing 
them skiing, boating and engaged in other activities that were 
                                                          
*Professor of Law, Thomas Jefferson School of Law, San Diego, California. 
The author wishes to thank Frank Bloch, Jon Dubin, and Carwina Weng for 
helpful comments on an earlier draft, and Deanna Sampson for continuing 
support. 
1 See, e.g., William K. Rashbaum & James C. McKinley, Jr., Charges of 106 in 
Huge Fraud Over Disability, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2014, at A1; Pervaiz Shallwani 
& Damian Paletta, Ex-NYPD Cops, Firefighters Charged With Disability Fraud, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 2014, at A2; Hearing on the Soc. Sec. Disability Ins. Fraud 
Scheme in N.Y.C., Before the Soc. Sec. Subcomm. of the H. Ways and Means 
Comm., 113th Cong., 2nd Sess. (2014) (statement of Patrick P. O’Carroll, Jr., 
Inspector Gen. Soc. Sec. Admin.), available at 
http://oig.ssa.gov/newsroom/congressional-testimony/jan16, last visited Feb. 10, 
2014 (hereinafter, O’Carroll Testimony).  
2 Raymond Lavallee, age 83, is a former FBI agent and was a senior prosecutor 
with the Nassau County District Attorney’s office. Rashbaum & McKinley, 
supra note 1, at A1. 
3 Id. See also Shallwani & Paletta, supra note 1, at A2; O’Carroll Testimony, 
supra note 1. 
4 O’Carroll Testimony, supra note 1. 
5 Rashbaum & McKinley, supra note 1, at A1; Shallwani & Paletta, supra note 1 
at A2; O’Carroll Testimony, supra note 1. 
6 Rashbaum & McKinley, supra note 1, at A1; Shallwani & Paletta, supra note 
1, at A2; O’Carroll Testimony, supra note 1. 
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clearly incompatible with their claims of disability.7 
 Announcement of the fraud came at a time of already great 
consternation regarding the overall health of the Social Security 
Disability (SSD) system. Since the economic crisis of 2008, and 
the contraction of the United States employment market, the 
number of SSD claims has risen dramatically.8 Aside from leading 
to significant delays in the processing of such claims and a backlog 
of undecided cases, the pressures put on the “trust fund”9 that pays 
for social security disability benefits have caused experts to 
estimate that the trust fund may become insolvent in the next few 
years.10 The prognosis is significantly more bleak than the ones 
that apply to the more frequently discussed Social Security 
Retirement fund and the Medicare trust fund, which are estimated 
to remain solvent without any changes to current laws through 
2040 and 2029 respectively.11 In light of these financial pressures, 
the price tag of the current fraud, approximately $21 million 
dollars in fraudulent benefits paid to date, with the possibility of 
much more to be uncovered,12 seems particularly troubling. The 
fraud has also served to provide further fuel for long-simmering 
political pressures coming from those who contend that the SSD 
system is too generous and is in serious need of reform.13 
 Additionally, the nature of the above-mentioned recent frauds 
                                                          
7 Rashbaum & McKinley, supra note 1, at A1; Shallwani & Paletta, supra note 
1, at A2; O’Carroll Testimony, supra note 1. 
8 See Damian Paletta, Insolvency Looms, as States Drain U.S. Disability Fund, 
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL 19 (March 22, 2011) (hereinafter, Paletta, 
Insolvency Looms). 
9 The term trust fund is placed in quotes here because the government’s SSD 
account is not literally a trust fund. A portion of each employee’s FICA (Federal 
Insurance and Contributions Act) or social security tax payments are placed in 
an SSD account. However, rather than the money remaining in that account until 
the particular employee becomes disabled, the money is used to pay benefits to 
persons currently receiving SSD benefits. See OFFICIAL SOCIAL SECURITY 
WEBSITE, Disability Insurance Trust Fund, 
http://www.ssa.gov/oact/progdata/describedi.html (last visited October 13, 
2014). To the extent current revenues exceed current expenditures from the 
account, the money is invested. Id. However, the account has run a deficit in 
each of the past five years. Rachel Greszler, Social Security Disability Trust 
Fund Will be Exhausted in Just Two Years: Beneficiaries Facing Nearly 20 
Percent Benefit Cuts, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/08/social-security-disability-
insurance-trust-fund-will-be-exhausted-in-just-two-years-beneficiaries-facing-
nearly-20-percent-cut-in-benefits (last visited October 13, 2014). 
10 Paletta, Insolvency Looms, supra note 8. 
11 Id. 
12 Rashbaum & McKinley, supra note 1, at A1. 
13 See, e.g., Jon C. Dubin & Robert E. Rains, Scapegoating Social Security 
Disability Claimants (and the Judges Who Evaluate Them), 6 ADVANCE: THE J. 
OF THE ACS ISSUE GROUPS 199, 199 & nn. 1-2 (2012). 
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makes them particularly galling. First, the police officers and 
firefighters who perpetrated the fraud had previously sworn to 
uphold and defend the very laws that they broke. Second, the fact 
that they exploited fears and memories of the 9/11 attacks, as well 
as the suffering of so many that were genuinely scarred by those 
events seems particularly cynical and reprehensible. Finally, this 
particular fraud came on the heels of the announcement of at least 
a couple of other large scale scams involving SSD fraud, raising 
the specter of additional frauds on perhaps a scale greater than had 
previously been imagined.14 
 The day after the indictments were handed down, D. Randall 
Frye, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) with the Social Security 
Administration (SSA) and the head of the Association of 
Administrative Law Judges wrote an editorial for the New York 
Times both decrying the fraud and suggesting a number of steps 
that should be taken to reform the SSD system to make such frauds 
less likely to occur in the future.15 One particular matter that Judge 
Frye decried was the SSA policy, which prevents Judges, such as 
himself, and other SSA employees from visiting the Facebook 
pages and other social media accounts of disability claimants.16 
Judge Frye intimated that without this policy, judges like him 
might have been able to detect the inconsistencies between 
claimants’ actual lives and their disability files that investigators 
ultimately discovered in uncovering the fraud.17 Additionally, 
Judge Frye criticized the fact that while attorneys often represent 
claimants such as those involved in the New York fraud at their 
social security hearings, the SSA is not represented by counsel.18 
Thus, Judge Frye suggested that providing legal representation for 
the government in all disability hearings would reduce fraudulent 
and improper awards of benefits.19 
 Aside from the aforementioned reasons, the announcement of 
the New York disability fraud scheme was particularly troubling 
for yet another reason. At the time the indictments were 
announced, I was serving as counsel to a claimant in a SSD case. I 
run a legal clinic at Thomas Jefferson School of Law for homeless 
veterans with substance abuse problems, who are participating in a 
nationally recognized recovery program, Veterans Village of San 
Diego.20 Most of our clients are “dual diagnosed,” meaning they 
                                                          
14 O’Carroll Testimony, supra note 1; Paletta, supra note 8. 
15 D. Randall Frye, Fixing Disability Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2014, at A17. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 For a general description of the program, see Dale Margolin Cecka, Steven K. 
Berenson, Lisa V. Martin, Karen Pearlman Raab, & Maryann Zavez, 
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have at least one diagnosed mental illness in addition to their 
substance abuse problem.21 We will call the claimant in this case 
“Major,” a homeless veteran who served ten years in the United 
States Army.22 Major had only entered the recovery program a 
short period of time before he was scheduled to appear before an 
ALJ for a hearing on his claim. Indeed, I first met Major about a 
week before his scheduled hearing. Because I was not willing to 
take Major’s case on such short notice, he and I agreed that our 
clinic would represent him on the condition that we were able to 
obtain a continuance of his hearing. Fortunately, the judge on the 
case was willing to grant an approximate two-month continuance 
to allow my students and I time to prepare.23  
 After the continuance was granted and I filed the SSA’s official 
form designating me as Appointed Representative for Major’s 
hearing, I was able to access the electronic file for the hearing.24 
Given the long history of medical treatment that Major had shared 
with me, the file relating to his disability application was 
shockingly thin. The file only contained medical records for a short 
period of time, approximately one year between the time of his 
application in September 2010 and late 2011, despite Major’s 
continuous treatment at the local VA hospital from late 2011 up to 
early 2014. While I am not an experienced disability attorney, it 
was clear that the medical records were not sufficient to support 
Major’s claim and Major’s application would almost certainly have 
been denied had his hearing gone forward as originally scheduled. 
Indeed, Major had been denied SSD benefits several times 
before.25 
                                                                                                                                  
Empowerment, Innovation, and Service: Law School Programs Provide Access 
to Justice and Instill a Commitment to Serve, 48 FAM. CT. REV. 672, 675-76 
(2010); Steven K. Berenson, Homeless Veterans and Child Support, 45 FAM. L. 
Q. 173, 186 (2011). 
21 See Definition of Dual Diagnosis, Medline Plus, available at 
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/dualdiagnosis.html, last visited May 27, 
2014. 
22 The details of Major’s case are deliberately kept vague throughout this article 
so as to avoid violating his confidentiality rights. However, Major did consent 
expressly to a general discussion of his case in this article. 
23 Note that by this time more than three years had already passed since Major 
filed his initial claim for benefits. 
24 Social Security Form SSA-1696, available at http://www.ssa.gov/online/ssa-
1696.pdf, last visited, May 27, 2014. I participate in the SSA’s Appointed 
Representative Services program, which allows me online access to client claim 
files. See http://www.socialsecurity.gov/ar/, last visited May 27, 2014. 
25 There are actually two separate types of disability benefits available from the 
SSA. The first, Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) is authorized by 
Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401, et seq. In brief, persons are 
eligible to receive SSDI if they have worked a certain number of quarters within 
a certain period of time. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(c)(1)(B). Taxes on their earnings 
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 However, any person who spoke with Major, even a short time 
would conclude: 1) that he suffers from at least some form of 
mental illness; and 2) his chances of obtaining a steady job are 
very slim in the current U.S. economy. Even with the two-month 
continuance and the assistance from the legal clinic, an estimation 
of Major’s odds for receiving SSI benefits were no greater than 
50%. This seeming contradiction, between the New York 
claimants, who were not disabled but could, and did, obtain 
benefits with relative ease, and Major, who is almost certainly 
unemployable yet has been thwarted in his effort to obtain 
disability benefits time and time again, only furthered my sense of 
outrage over the New York fraud. 
 It seems to me that as a result of the publicity surrounding the 
New York scam and Judge Frye’s reply, a number of “frauds” or 
falsehoods about the SSD system have been reinforced. For 
example, the “success” of the New York disability fraud scheme 
and the discussion around it suggests that it is too easy to receive 
                                                                                                                                  
are paid into a “trust fund” much like the Social Security Retirement fund, and 
that fund is used to pay SSDI benefits. Also like Social Security Retirement 
payments, the amount of SSDI benefits a person receives correlates to the level 
of that person’s income during the relevant period. Additionally, Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI) benefits are available under Title XVI of the Social 
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381, et seq. SSI is an anti-poverty program for 
disabled persons. Thus, while no prior work history or payments into a fund are 
required, strict income and asset restrictions do apply to SSI eligibility. For a 
general description and comparison of the two programs, see Fact Sheet, Social 
Security and Supplemental Security Income (SSI): What’s the Difference?, 
available at http://www.ssa.gov/sf/FactSheets/aianssavsssifinalrev.pdf, last 
visited June 2, 2014; Stan Hinden, AARP Bulletin, What’s the Difference 
Between SSDI and SSI?, available at http://www.aarp.org/work/social-
security/info-06-2012/social-security-disability-insurance-supplemental-
security-income.html, last visited June 2, 2014. It is possible for a person to 
receive both SSDI and SSI, if the amount of one’s SSDI payment is sufficiently 
low that it does not put the recipient over the income eligibility standard for SSI. 
See Robert Rains, Disability and Family Relationships: Marriage Penalties and 
Support Anomalies, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 561 (2006). Because Major had no 
compensated work history following his discharge from the military nearly 20 
years ago, he was ineligible for SSDI. However, his impoverishment did leave 
him economically eligible for SSI. In any event, the determination of whether a 
person is disabled is the same for both programs. Richard P. Weishaupt & 
Robert E. Rains, Sullivan v. Zebley: New Disability Standards for Indigent 
Children to Obtain Government Benefits, 35  ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 539, 547-48 
(1991). Thus, I will not generally distinguish between the two programs 
throughout the following discussion. Because SSI is funded separately from the 
SSD trust fund out of general government revenues, and because the amount 
spent on SSI benefits each year is very small in comparison to the amount spent 
on SSDI benefits, SSI is only tangentially relevant to the overall fiscal 
soundness of the SSD program. Disabled children may also be eligible to 
receive SSI. However, throughout this article, I will only discuss the SSD 
program as it applies to adults.  
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disability benefits. However, a closer look at the system belies this 
claim. Moreover, in many cases it is the neediest claimants and 
those least able to navigate the system that finds it most difficult to 
obtain benefits. 
 Additionally, Judge Frye and others suggest that disability 
determinations would be more accurate if the SSA jettisoned its 
non-adversarial, inquisitorial hearing system in favor of a more 
traditional adversary adjudication model, with the SSA represented 
by a lawyer, just as many claimants are. However, no actual 
evidence supports the claim that an adversarial system would work 
better than the inquisitorial system in making SSD determinations. 
Given the potential of tremendous transaction costs involved in 
changing fundamentally the world’s largest administrative 
adjudicatory system, the burden of proof must be on those who 
would advocate such a change to demonstrate that the benefits 
would in fact outweigh the costs. Moreover, any assessment of the 
future benefits of a change to an adversarial system would have to 
consider that the costs of adjudication in such a system would 
almost certainly increase going forward. 
 Many details have yet to emerge about the New York fraud 
scheme, but at first blush, it appears that it focused on the 
“medical” aspect of disability determinations, rather than the 
vocational aspect. However, to the extent that the medical aspect of 
disability determinations is flawed, the vocational aspect is 
completely out of line with reality. Thus, the third fraud addressed 
is the myth that the vocational aspects of disability determinations 
reflect the reality of the contemporary U.S. economy. 
 This article addresses each of these three frauds about the SSD 
program: 1) that it is too easy to obtain disability benefits;26 2) that 
a fully adversarial adjudicatory system with attorney representation 
for SSA would improve SSD outcomes;27 and 3) that SSD hearings 
result in bona fide vocational assessments.28 After debunking the 
three frauds, the article goes on to demonstrate how the results in 
Major’s case to date further rebut the three frauds.29  
  Debunking the first two frauds addressed here does not lead to 
the conclusion that major reforms are required to the current 
system. After all, if it is already challenging to obtain SSD 
benefits, there is no need to tighten eligibility standards, as some 
have called for, to address the fiscal challenges the program 
presently faces and the political pressures that have been brought 
to bear upon the program. Similarly, if the critics of the current 
                                                          
26 See infra Part I. 
27 See infra Part II. 
28 See infra Part III. 
29 See infra Part IV. 
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SSD inquisitorial adjudicatory process have failed to make the case 
for a change to an adversarial system, then the current system 
should remain in place. However, rebutting the fraud that the SSD 
system includes bona fide vocational assessments that accurately 
reflect the modern economy does call out for change to the system. 
Unlike others who have suggested that the vocational aspect of the 
SSD process is amenable to effective reforms,30 both my 
discussion of this particular fraud, and the history of the SSA’s 
inability to develop a system of reliable vocational assessments, 
leads me to conclude that the vocational aspect of the SSD system 
should be scrapped. Thus, only those who meet a medical standard 
of disability would be found disabled. Though not its primary goal, 
such a change would also greatly reduce the number of persons 
who would receive SSD benefits in the future, thus alleviating both 
the current fiscal and political pressures on the system. Such a 
change would also be consistent with social policy in effect at least 
since passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act, under which 
other than those who are completely medically disabled from 
working, persons with disabilities should be given the support and 
accommodations necessary to allow them to participate in the 
workforce. 
 Nonetheless, a change that would leave potentially thousands 
or even millions of persons who would have been found disabled 
under the existing SSD system without any public support in our 
current, challenging economic environment would be less than 
humane. Thus, elimination of the vocational aspects of the current 
SSD system would require its replacement with a new program 
that would involve job training and placement services, workplace 
accommodations and support and income support throughout the 
process to both displaced workers and those with disabilities that 
are not severe enough to qualify for benefits under the reformed 
SSD system. Thus, the article concludes by making the case for a 
new entitlement program along these lines.31 
 
I. FRAUD # 1: IT IS TOO EASY TO GET SOCIAL 
SECURITY DISABILITY BENEFITS 
 
 Formally, to obtain SSD benefits, an applicant must show an 
“inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of 
any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which 
can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be 
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 
                                                          
30 See infra note 225 and accompanying text. 
31 See infra Part V. 
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months."32 At least on its face, this disability standard appears to 
be significantly more stringent than that which applies to many 
other disability programs, including the disability programs of 
many Western European countries.33 
 On the other hand, the apparent ease with which the New York 
disability claimants were able to secure benefits fuels the notion 
that it is relatively easy to obtain social security disability benefits. 
Some recent reports about the system also give credence to this 
assumption. For example, a recent Wall Street Journal article 
reported that in 2010 approximately 67% of the SSD cases that 
went to hearing before an ALJ resulted in approval of the claim for 
benefits.34 However, in 2013, that rate fell to 56%.35 This suggests 
that at least to a certain extent, the system can regulate itself in 
response to an increase in claims in recent years and to concerns 
about the solvency of the system.36 
 Additionally, the relatively high success rate of claimants who 
appear before ALJs obscure the fact that ALJ hearings are the third 
step of an administrative process in which claimants fare less well 
in the earlier two phases. First, a claim for SSD benefits starts with 
an application filed by the claimant. These claims can be filed 
online, by telephone, or in person at a local Social Security 
office.37 These initial claims are usually reviewed by a state 
Disability Determination Service.38 Between 2002 and 2010, 74% 
of the disability claims filed at this level were denied.39 If denied, 
the claimant may then request “reconsideration” of the denial.40 In 
theory, a request for reconsideration requires a de novo review by 
the state agency that made the initial denial of the application.41 
However, an average of only 3% of those who sought 
reconsideration of their denials between 2002 and 2010 were 
                                                          
32 42 USC §423(d)(1)(A).  
33 Dubin & Rains, supra note 13, at 117; Jon C. Dubin, The Labor Market Side 
of Disability-Benefits Policy and Law, 20 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 1, 51 & 
n. 217 (2011) (hereinafter, Dubin, Labor Market). 
34 Damian Paletta, Government Pulls in Reins on Disability Judges, THE WALL 
STREET JOURNAL, at A1 (December 26, 2013). 
35 Id. 
36 See supra notes 8-10. 
37 Oren R. Griffin, Social Security Disability Law and the Obstacles Facing 
Claimants With Mental Disabilities, 36 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 147, 153 
(2012)(hereinafter, Griffin, Obstacles).  
38 Id. 
39 Social Security Administration, ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT ON THE SOCIAL 
SECURITY DISABILITY INSURANCE PROGRAM, 2012, Chart 11, p. 143 (Feb. 26, 
2014), 
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/di_asr/2012/di_asr12.pdf, 
(hereinafter SSA Report). 
40 Griffin, Obstacles, supra note 37, at 153.  
41 Id. 
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awarded benefits at this stage of the process.42 If reconsideration is 
denied, then the claimant can seek a hearing before an 
administrative law judge.43 The ALJ hearing is also a de novo 
review.44 Claimants who are dissatisfied with the ALJ’s decision 
can invoke the final intra-agency stage of the review process, an 
appeal to the Social Security Appeals Council.45 Only 13% of all 
SSD claims filed between 2002 and 2010 were approved at either 
the ALJ or Appeals Council stage.46 Judicial review of Appeals 
Council decisions is available, but the scope of review is narrow.47 
Only about 1% of SSD claims filed ever make it into the federal 
court system.48 Overall, 41% of the claims filed for disability 
benefits were approved between 2002 and 2010.49 
 Due to low levels of success at the early stages of the SSD 
process, a high degree of persistence is required on behalf of 
claimants to achieve ultimate success. Yet, long delays at each 
phase of the process can challenge even the most determined and 
persistent claimant. The average amount of time it takes to obtain a 
decision on an initial application for benefits is approximately four 
to six months.50 Reconsideration requests then take another three to 
five months.51 It takes approximately another 14 months to get a 
hearing before and ALJ, where the largest proportion of disability 
applications are approved.52 This means that many successful 
                                                          
42 SSA Report, supra note 39, at Chart 11, p. 143. In 2006, the SSA announced 
plans to scrap this second stage of the review process. See Frank S. Bloch, 
Jeffrey S. Lubbers, & Paul R. Verkuil, The Social Security Administration’s 
New Disability Adjudication Rules: A Significant and Promising Reform, 92 
CORNELL L. REV. 235, 235 (2007) (hereinafter, Bloch, et al., New Rules). 
However, these proposed reforms were never fully implemented. See Griffin, 
Obstacles, supra note 37, at 152 n. 27. At present, there are ten “prototype” 
states in which the reconsideration stage has been eliminated. See Jeffrey S. 
Wolfe & Dale Glendening, Through the Disability Looking Glass: A Considered 
Response to Professor Pashler’s Wild Social Security Hare, 44 U. MEM. L. REV. 
523, 581 & n. 255 (2014); Preparing for Your Social Security Disability Appeal, 
http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/preparing-your-social-security-
disability-appeal.html (last visited December 31, 2014). 
43 Griffin, Obstacles, supra note 37, at 153. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 SSA Report, supra note 39, at Chart 11, p. 143. 
47 See Frank Bloch, BLOCH ON SOCIAL SECURITY § 6:2 (2014); Bryan C. Bond, 
Note:  Taking it on the Chenery: Should the Principles of Chenery I Apply in 
Social Security Disability Cases?, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2157, 2170 (2011). 
48 Jeannie H. Kim, Social Security Disability Law 101, 55 ORANGE COUNTY 
LAW. 26 (July 2013) (hereinafter Kim, Disability 101). 
49 SSA Report, supra note 39, at Chart 11, p. 143. 
50 Kim, Disability 101, supra note 48, at 26. Note that the wait times mentioned 
here can vary greatly among different Social Security regional offices. 
51 Id.  
52 Id. 
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claimants will have to wait approximately two years to receive 
their benefits. Appeals to the Appeals Council can add another 16 
months on average to the process.53 If successful, claimants may 
obtain paid benefits retroactive near to the original filing date of 
the initial application.54 However, even retroactive benefits may 
not be enough to make many claimants whole. After all, by 
definition, successful claimants are deemed unable to support 
themselves through employment.55 With a paucity of other public 
resources available for support,56 many low-income applicants may 
simply not have sufficient resources to survive the two plus year 
process in order to receive funds.57  
 At first glance, it may seem appropriate that the highest rate of 
success is at the third stage of the administrative process – the ALJ 
hearing. After all, it must be the case that a large number of 
completely unmeritorious requests are filed, and it is easy to weed 
these applications out at the earliest stages of the process. But 
those with the most meritorious claims are likely to persist, even if 
it takes the claimant years and many levels of appeal before they 
see their benefits. 
 The problem is that no empirical evidence supports this 
hypothesis. We do not know which applicants do and do not persist 
with their disability claims. In fact, there is reason to believe that 
the applicants in most need are the least likely to persist through 
the lengthy, tedious and multi-layered process of appealing an 
initial denial.58 Those applicants who are poor, homeless or have 
serious mental health issues are less likely to have resources to 
“stay the course” and see the process through to a successful 
conclusion. 
 In any event, it is almost certain that at each level of the 
appeals process, and particularly at the early stages, many people 
                                                          
53 Id. 
54 SSI benefits may be paid retroactive to the first day of the month following 
the month in which the application for benefits was filed, provided the disability 
standard was met as of that date. SSDI benefits may be paid up to 12 months 
prior to the filing of an application, though there is a five month waiting period 
after the onset of disability before payments can begin. See generally, If I Am 
Determined Disabled, How Far Back Will Social Security Pay Benefits?, 
SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY & SSI RESOURCE CENTER, 
http://www.ssdrc.com/disabilityquestions2-84.html (last visited December 31, 
2014). 
55 See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) (2004); Griffin, Obstacles, supra note 37, at 
154-56. 
56 See infra notes 194-96. 
57 Griffin, Obstacles, supra note 37, at 186. 
58 Angela Littwin, The Affordability Paradox: How Consumer Bankruptcy’s 
Greatest Weakness May Account for Its Surprising Success, 52 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1933, 1997 n. 340 (2011). 
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with meritorious claims merely give up, out of frustration, 
despairing of their ultimate prospects for success on the claim or 
simply lack the legal assistance and other resources necessary to 
continue. Indeed, meritorious applicants withdrawing their claims 
from the process would save the federal government money in the 
long run, although it defeats the service objectives behind the 
disability program. Similar processes of denial apply in a broad 
range of government benefit programs. Nearly three decades ago, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) scholar Michael 
Lipsky described this process as “bureaucratic disentitlement.”59 
Rather than restricting access to government benefit programs at 
the level of statutory or regulatory eligibility standards, access is 
restricted at the lowest level of bureaucratic application of 
eligibility rules, through procedural hurdles rather than substantive 
eligibility requirements. While this process operates in a variety of 
public benefit programs,60 a more honest approach to rationing 
scarce government resources would be to tighten eligibility 
standards, rather than driving otherwise eligible claimants away 
through delay, frustration and obfuscation.  
 In Major’s case, despite substantial mental and physical health 
issues, he was able to appeal from both the SSA’s initial denial of 
his claim and its denial of his request for reconsideration. 
However, as was supposed above with regard to at least some of 
the neediest SSD applicants, Major’s limited income resulted in his 
being homeless and living on the streets for most of the 42 months 
between his initial application for benefits and his ALJ hearing.61 
                                                          
59 Michael Lipsky, Bureaucratic Disentitlement in Social Welfare Programs, 58 
SOC. SERV. REV. 3 (1984). 
60 Littwin, supra note 58, at 1950, 1989. 
61 Major was not entirely without income throughout the relevant period. Major 
received a small amount of money from the Department of Veterans Affairs 
(VA) for service connected disability benefits for the physical injuries resulting 
from a helicopter accident he was involved in while in the military. However, 
until shortly before his SSD ALJ hearing, the VA had not “connected” Major’s 
mental health issues to his term of military service. Thus, he did not receive VA 
disability payments for those ailments. The VA determined that Major’s 
physical injuries impaired his earning capacity by 30%, thus resulting in 
monthly payments of a few hundred dollars during the relevant period. Though 
any retroactive SSI benefits Major would be entitled to would be offset by the 
VA benefits he had received during the relevant period (after the first $20), 
Major would still be entitled to SSI payments of a few hundred dollars per 
month, given the monthly SSI payment amount during the relevant period. See 
Understanding Supplemental Security Income – 2014 Version, OFFICIAL SOCIAL 
SECURITY WEBSITE, http://www.socialsecurity.gov/ssi/text-income-ussi.htm 
(last visited June 2, 2014). As will be discussed in greater detail shortly before 
his SSD ALJ hearing, the VA did “service connect” Major’s depression, thus 
upping his disability rating to 80%, and his monthly compensation to around 
$1,500. Because this amount is greater than the SSI eligibility standard, the 
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 Despite frequent suggestions to the contrary, it is important to 
note that a finding of disability does not automatically entitle the 
claimant to a lifetime stream of benefits. If the claimant’s 
condition improves, either on its own, through treatment, or 
perhaps through advances in medicine or other available therapies, 
the claimant is subject to having their benefits terminated with a 
finding that he or she is no longer disabled.62 It may be the case 
that for an individual claimant, the ALJ will order a review of the 
claimant’s condition after a certain period of time following the 
hearing. Additionally, the SSA has a program to conduct 
Continuing Disability Reviews (CDRs) of SSD recipients to assess 
their continuing eligibility to receive benefits.63 The amount of 
resources the SSA has devoted to CDRs has varied a great deal 
over the three decades the CDR program has been in place.64 
However, critics of the SSD program focus particularly on the 
promise of expanded CDRs to combat the growth in expenditures 
under the program.65  
 In any event, the foregoing discussion makes clear that 
obtaining and maintaining SSD benefits is far from a cakewalk. 
Indeed, the overwhelming majority of SSD applicants are 
unsuccessful, and even many with meritorious claims are not able 
to sustain the often long and tortuous effort required to obtain 
benefits. 
 
II. FRAUD # 2: AN ADVERSARY SOCIAL SECURITY 
HEARING PROCESS WOULD BE PREFERABLE 
  
Judge Frye’s primary critique of the system, one that has been 
                                                                                                                                  
prospective aspect of Major’s SSI claim was rendered moot by his new VA 
rating. However, several thousand dollars worth of claimed retroactive benefits 
remained in issue at Major’s ALJ hearing. For a more detailed description of the 
VA’s disability compensation system, see Steven K. Berenson, Legal Services 
for Struggling Veterans – Then and Now, 31 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 101, 
117-19 (2009).  
62 See William R. Morton, Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) Reform: 
An Overview of Proposals to Reduce the Growth in SSDI Rolls, 
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS 5 (2013), 
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43054.pdf (last visited July 30, 2014); Drew A. 
Swank, Money for Nothing: Five Small Steps to Begin the Long Journey to 
Restoring Integrity to the Social Security Administration’s Disability Programs, 
41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 155, 166 (2012) (hereinafter, Swank, Five Small Steps). 
63 Morton, supra note 62, at 6-7; Swank, Five Small Steps, supra note 62, at 166. 
64 Morton, supra note 62, at 6-7; Swank, Five Small Steps, supra note 62, at 166.  
65 Swank, Five Small Steps, supra note 62, at 166; Wolfe & Glendening, supra 
note 42, at 587.  
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made by other commentators, 66 is that the SSD system would be 
improved if its current “inquisitorial” approach were replaced with 
an “adversarial” approach more consistent with that used in 
American courts.67 The fundamental differences between 
inquisitorial and adversary systems lie in the roles of the legal 
advocates and the judges. In adversarial systems, at least as ideally 
constituted, each party to the dispute is represented by a skilled 
advocate, whose role is to present the evidence most advantageous 
to the party represented by the advocate, and to challenge the 
evidence presented by the other side.68 The advocate’s duties run 
primarily to the represented party and the advocate has no duty to 
assist the opposing party, and in fact may be prohibited from 
introducing evidence that may undermine their client’s position in 
the dispute.69 Because the evidence of each side’s evidence is 
presented effectively through this format, the role of the judge is 
passive in the in adversarial systems. The judge has no authority to 
seek out evidence, or to conduct an independent investigation 
separate from the presentations made by each party’s advocate. 
The judge simply renders an impartial decision based on the 
presented evidence. 
                                                          
66 See, e.g., David Autor & Mark Duggan, The Growth in the Social Security 
Disability Rolls: A Fiscal Crisis Unfolding, 20 J. ECON. PERSP. 71, 93 (2006); 
Wolfe & Glendening, supra note 42, at 584.  
67 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. These suggestions are also not new. 
In the early 1980s, the Social Security Administration Representation Project 
(SSARP) was launched in five regional SSA offices. See Frank S. Bloch, Jeffrey 
S. Lubbers, & Paul R. Verkuil, Developing a Full And Fair Evidentiary Record 
in a Non-Adversary Setting: Two Proposals for Improving Social Security 
Disability Adjudications, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 42 (2003) (hereinafter Bloch, 
et al., Full and Fair). However, the Project was enjoined by a Federal District 
Court on grounds that it unconstitutionally deprived claimants of their 
procedural due process rights, and violated both the Social Security Act and its 
implementing regulations. Salling v. Bowen, 641 F. Supp. 1046 (W.D. Va. 
1986). Among its findings, the Court determined that attorney representation for 
the SSA in the demonstration cities increased the amount of time it took to 
decide cases, increased reversal rates of ALJ decisions, failed to achieve 
uniformity of decisions among ALJs, failed to achieve full and fair development 
of case files, and failed to improve hearing quality more generally. Id. at 1061-
64. For a discussion and mild critique of this decision, see Bloch, et al., Full and 
Fair, supra at 50-52. Thank you to Jon Dubin for bringing this decision to my 
attention.  
68 See generally, David Luban, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 27 (2007); 
Bryan T. Camp, Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process and the Partial 
Paradigm Shift in the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 56 FLA. L. 
REV. 1, 17-20 (2004) (hereinafter, Camp, Inquisitorial Process); Jon C. Dubin, 
Torquemada Meets Kafka: The Misapplication of the Issue Exhaustion Doctrine 
to Inquisitorial Administrative Proceedings, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1289, 1300 
(1997) (hereinafter, Dubin, Issue Exhaustion).  
69 Luban, supra note 68, at 27. 
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 By contrast, in an inquisitorial system, the judge, rather than 
the parties’ representative is the primary authority for development 
of the record.70 Thus, the judge plays a much more active role in 
framing the legal issues, participating in the discovery and 
presentation of evidence and in the overall conduct of the 
proceedings.71 As a result of the enhanced judicial role, the roles of 
the parties’ advocates are correspondingly decreased. The parties’ 
advocates serve to aid the judge’s inquiry into the matter, rather 
than to direct the course of the proceedings. 
 As stated above, most American judicial systems follow an 
adversarial model. By contrast, the inquisitorial model dominates 
in Europe and many Latin American judicial systems.72 Indeed, 
many common features of adversarial models are enshrined in the 
U.S. Constitution. Although such features primarily relate to 
criminal proceedings such as the right to counsel, the rights to call 
and cross-examine witnesses, the right to a jury trial, the right not 
to testify against oneself and the right to confront one’s accusers.73 
 The debate on the relative merits of inquisitorial versus 
adversarial systems has been longstanding, and has not resulted in 
a clear winner.74 Legal Ethics scholar David Luban has 
persuasively argued that since a clear case has not been made on 
the merits for either system, the transaction costs that would be 
incurred in switching from one system to the other cannot be 
justified regardless of which system is in place.75 
 The question of adjudication costs is particularly pressing in 
the context of SSD hearings, which have been described as the 
largest administrative adjudicatory system in the world.76 
Certainly, adversary hearings, with both sides represented by 
counsel, would take longer and add to the cost of the SSA’s 
adjudicatory system.77 Consolidation of the record development, 
fact-finding, issue spotting and decision making roles in the SSD 
ALJ results in efficiencies which, if sacrificed across the huge 
number of SSD cases decided each year, could result in massive 
cost increases to a system that is already in financial crisis.78 
                                                          
70 Camp, Inquisitorial Process, supra note 68, at 18; Dubin, Issue Exhaustion, 
supra note 68, at 1300. 
71 Dubin, Issue Exhaustion, supra note 68, at 1303; Vicki Lens, Revisiting the 
Promise of Kelly v. Goldberg in the Era of Welfare Reform, 21 GEO. J. ON 
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 43, 84 (2013). 
72 Dubin, Issue Exhaustion, supra note 68, at 1300. 
73 These rights are generally not recognized in inquisitorial systems. 
74 See Luban, supra note 68, at 19-64. 
75 Luban, supra note 68, at 56.  
76 Dubin, Issue Exhaustion, supra note 68, at 1291 (citations omitted).  
77 Dubin, Issue Exhaustion, supra note 68, at 1318. See also Morton, supra note 
62, at 26. 
78 Dubin, Issue Exhaustion, supra note 68, at 1320. 
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 The inquisitorial approach in SSD hearings seems to be 
justified on philosophical grounds as well. As Luban79 and other 
scholars have pointed out,80 the argument for the adversarial 
system is strongest as it relates to criminal law. Perhaps the 
greatest strength of the adversarial system is the ability to 
effectively safeguard the rights of the accused.81 Indeed, we 
tolerate significant restrictions on prosecutors’ ability to secure 
convictions in the name of protecting defendants’ rights. Yet this 
seems appropriate to us in a liberal democracy such as the United 
States, where government overreach is viewed as a greater threat 
than failure to punish guilty criminals.82 Better one hundred guilty 
go free than one innocent is convicted.83  
By contrast, the adversary system is not as justified in civil 
cases between private parties, where government overreach is not a 
concern.84 In this regard, it may seem that administrative cases are 
more analogous to criminal cases than civil cases because the 
proceeding is between a citizen and the state. Indeed, for some 
administrative proceedings, such as deportation cases, where the 
potential for government overreach is great, the analogy to 
criminal cases may be strong.85 However, the analogy does not 
hold for SSD and other public benefit cases. Rather than the state 
seeking to impose unwanted action upon a citizen who did not seek 
the assistance of the state, SSD cases involve citizens affirmatively 
seeking the assistance of the government.86 In such cases, it may 
well be that an inquisitorial approach is preferable, as it better 
allows the government adjudicator the opportunity to protect the 
public interest in safeguarding limited government resources, while 
at the same time serving the social safety net objectives of the 
                                                          
79 Luban, supra note 68, at 28-29. 
80 See, e.g. Deborah Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Law Practice, 37 
STANFORD L. REV. 589, 605 (1985); Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as 
Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 12 (1975). 
81 Luban, supra note 68, at 29. 
82 Id.  
83 Id.  
84 Luban, supra note 68, at 30. 
85 Luban, supra note 68, at 31. 
86 Though this argument applies strongly to SSI cases there is a wrinkle in SSDI 
cases, where the applicant at least in part seeks to recoup their own contributions 
to the system. In other words, whereas the SSI applicant seeks government 
assistance entirely, the SSDI applicant can claim an entitlement to resources 
based upon their prior contributions. However, the Social Security system, 
which includes both its retirement and its disability components, has always 
combined aspects of social insurance and public assistance, and a successful 
SSD or Social Security retirement claimant will often receive much more in 
benefits than they contributed to the trust fund. Thus, the inquisitorial system is 
warranted in this situation too. 
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program.87  
 Decades ago, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the SSA’s inquisitorial system against a due 
process challenge.88 In that case the SSA itself argued that a move 
to an adversarial process would not necessarily benefit claimants.89 
 A shift to an adversarial system would be incompatible with 
Judge Frye’s other recommendation of giving ALJs the authority 
to view claimants’ Facebook and other social media presentations 
to search for evidence incompatible with their claim of being 
“disabled.” While such independent inquiry by a judge, at least 
theoretically, aligns with a judge’s role under the current 
inquisitorial model, it would be completely inconsistent with the 
passive role of the judge embodied in the adversarial approach 
advocated by Judge Frye. 
 The two major inquisitorial adjudicatory systems in the United 
States are the SSD system and the disability compensation 
program utilized by the Department of Veterans Affairs to pay 
benefits to disabled veterans.90 However, not all administrative 
benefits systems in the U.S. operate through an inquisitorial 
system. In fact, following the United States Supreme Court’s 
landmark decision in Goldberg v. Kelly,91 most “public welfare” 
benefit systems in the United States. operate through an adversarial 
model.92 However, following a recent empirical study of the 
effectiveness of administrative hearings, at least one scholar has 
called for public welfare hearings to move toward the inquisitorial 
model used by SSA, rather than the opposite movement suggested 
by Judge Frye and others.93 Other scholars have also touted the 
benefits of inquisitorial systems for large administrative 
bureaucracies.94 
 One of Judge Frye’s major reasons to move to adversarial 
proceedings in SSI cases is that most claimants are represented by 
counsel in ALJ hearings, which he argues throws off the balance 
                                                          
87 Accord Bloch, et al., Full and Fair, supra note 67, at 56-57. 
88 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971). 
89 Dubin, Issue Exhaustion, supra note 68, at 1305 & n.80 (citing to the SSA’s 
Supreme Court brief). 
90 For a very brief description of the VA’s “non-adversarial” disability 
determination process, see Berenson, Legal Services, supra note 61, at 118-24. 
91 397 U.S. 254 (1970). In Goldberg, the Court held that Constitutional Due 
Process requirements had to be observed before a state may terminate an 
individual’s welfare benefits. Id. 
92 Lens, supra note 71, at 43.  
93 Id. at 83. 
94 See Bryan T. Camp, The Failure of Adversary Process in the Administrative 
State, 84 IND. L.J. 57 (2009) (advocating an inquisitorial system for IRS 
Collection Due Process proceedings); Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of 
Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975). 
16
DePaul Journal for Social Justice, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 5
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jsj/vol9/iss1/5
DEPAUL JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
Volume 8, Issue 1  Winter 2015 
109 
presumed in inquisitorial proceedings. However, further inquiry 
must be conducted into both the contentions that claimants are 
effectively represented by lawyers in SSD hearings and that the 
government is not. 
 First, it is simply incorrect to suggest that the government’s 
interests are inadequately represented in SSD proceedings. As 
previously discussed, given that the vast majority of claims are 
rejected at the first two stages of the claim process, one can 
certainly not say that the government’s interests in protecting the 
public first are inadequately represented at those stages of the 
process. Further at the ALJ stage, though separate counsel does not 
represent the government, the ALJ is expressly charged with 
protecting the government’s interests.95 Representing the 
government’s interests is not the only obligation the ALJ has in 
administrative hearings. Thus, the ALJ has responsibilities to 
develop the case record fully, to assist claimants to present their 
case to the extent necessary and to issue a fair and well-reasoned 
decision on the merits.96 However, in cases where the claimant is 
represented by counsel, the ALJ’s need to assist the claimant is 
much less pronounced, and the ALJ’s role lends itself to serving as 
a representative of the Administration more than would be the case 
if the claimant were unrepresented. 
 Additionally, at this stage, unlike a typical judge, SSD ALJs 
are employees of one of the parties to the proceeding. While steps 
have been taken to insure the independence of SSD ALJs,97 these 
steps are imperfect, and there are instances of pressure bearing on 
ALJs by the agency to address issues in certain ways that are well 
documented.98 It is no stretch to observe that SSD ALJs are smart 
enough to know who “butters their bread.”99 
 Decades ago in a now-canonical article, Professor Marc 
Galanter addressed the question of why certain parties seemed to 
                                                          
95 Dubin, Issue Exhaustion, supra note 68, at 1303. 
96 These three distinct responsibilities have led to descriptions of Social Security 
ALJ’s “wearing three hats,” or descriptions of SSD hearings as “the three hat 
system.”  See Bloch, Full and Fair, supra note 67, at nn. 228 & 238; Bernard 
Schwartz, Adjudication and the Administrative Procedure Act, 32 TULSA L.J. 
203, 208-09 (1996).  
97 Jacob Bender, Note & Comments, Torn Between Two Masters: Flaws In The 
Social Security Disability Process, 45 U. TOL. L. REV. 619, 630 (2014).  
98 Wolfe & Glendening, supra note 42, at 591. 
99 See, e.g., Karen S. Lewis, Comment, Administrative Law Judges and the Code 
of Judicial Conduct: A Need for a Regulated Ethics, 94 DICK. L. REV. 929, 
957 (1990) (arguing that the primary threat to an ALJ's impartiality is their 
status as an employee of the agency, where they are subject to pressures to 
conform to agency standards and practices). 
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be much more successful than others in litigation.100 In doing so, 
Galanter drew a distinction between “repeat players,” and “one-
shotters.”101 Repeat players are those who litigate frequently in a 
given forum, whereas one-shotters litigate infrequently in the 
forum.102 As a result, repeat players develop experience and 
expertise in the forum that can overmatch one-shotters when they 
appear on opposite sides of a dispute. Additionally, repeat players 
tend to be large institutional entities, possessed of great resources, 
whereas one-shotters tend to be individuals with limited 
resources.103 Given both the frequency of their appearances in the 
forum, and their available resources, repeat players have an interest 
in investing and developing their advantages over one-shotters in 
the forum.104 Furthermore, over the course of their repeated 
appearances in the forum, repeat players can influence the “rules of 
the game,” to their advantage, through developing legal precedents 
and challenging and appealing certain disadvantageous 
decisions.105 Of course, this further exacerbates the advantages the 
repeat players hold over the one-timers in the forum. As a result, 
the “haves come out ahead,” as the title to Galanter’s article 
suggests. 
 Galanter’s views have been affirmed in numerous contexts 
over the past four decades.106 Of course, with regard to SSD 
hearings, the SSA is a classic repeat player, while the claimants 
who appear before it are classic one-shotters.107 In this regard, it is 
not significant that the SSA is not separately represented by an 
attorney in SSD hearings. Indeed, in a number of contexts, repeat 
players are able to exploit the numerous advantages they hold over 
one-timers without the benefit of attorney representation. For 
example, landlords are generally not represented by attorneys in 
housing court, but the dramatic advantages that landlords hold over 
                                                          
100 Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the 
Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC. REV. 95 (1974). 
101 Id. at 97. 
102 Id.  
103 Id. at 98. 
104 Id. at 98-99. 
105 Id. at 100. 
106 See, e.g., IN LITIGATION: DO THE HAVES STILL COME OUT AHEAD? (Herbert 
Kritzer & Susan Silbey eds. 2004); Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. 
Suchman, When the “Haves” Hold Court: Speculations on the Organizational 
Internalization of Law, 33 Law & Soc'y Rev. 941 (1999); Shauhin Taulesh, How 
the “Haves” Come Out Ahead in the Twenty-First Century, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 
519 (2013). 
107 See Erfat Massrey Cogan, Note, Executive Nonacquiescence: Problems of 
Statutory Interpretation and Executive Power, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1143, 1167 
(1987). See also Paris Baldacci, A Full and Fair Hearing: The Role of the ALJ 
in Assisting the Pro Se Litigant, 27 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 447, 
482 (2007); Lens, supra note 71, at 77. 
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tenants in this forum are well known.108 The lower level 
bureaucrats who represent the SSA at the lower stages of the SSD 
claims process and ALJs at administrative hearings are more than 
sufficient to cement the huge institutional advantages the SSA 
holds over claimants in the SSD application process. 
 Perhaps providing experienced legal representatives on behalf 
of claimants would help to narrow the gap between the repeat 
player SSA and its one-shotter claimants. Yet Galanter contended 
that for a variety of reasons, legal representation would only go so 
far in narrowing the gap.109 He also suggested that adding lawyers 
for the repeat player (the SSA in our case) as Judge Frye 
recommends would produce greater benefits for the repeat player 
than similarly providing counsel for the one-shotter will.110 Thus, 
Judge Frye’s proposal would further exacerbate the advantages 
already enjoyed by the administration in ALJ hearings.  
 A closer look at the manner in which representation is provided 
in SSD cases further undermines Judge Frye’s contention that 
claimants’ counsel overmatches the agency. First, fewer claimants 
are represented by counsel at the first two stages of the SSD 
application process than at the ALJ stage. Thus, for reasons 
discussed above, many claimants will drop out of the process 
before they even have an opportunity to consult with an attorney. 
Second, about 20% of SSD claimants still go unrepresented at the 
hearing stage.111 For reasons posited by Galanter and his progeny, 
such self-represented claimants are the most heavily out-gunned at 
the hearing stage. Also, for reasons described in greater detail 
below, the most vulnerable claimants with the most challenging 
claims are most likely to appear without counsel at their ALJ 
hearings. This makes the task facing such claimants all the more 
difficult. 
 A great disparity exists in the quality of representation 
available to claimants for ALJ hearings, even for those who are 
able to obtain representation, at this stage of the process. First, 
SSD hearings are one of the few adjudicatory forums in which 
claimants’ representatives do not need to be licensed attorneys.112 
In fact, non-lawyers represent a large percentage of represented 
                                                          
108 See, e.g., Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and 
Subordination of Poor Tenants’ Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
533 (1992). 
109 Galanter, supra note 100, at 114. 
110 Id. 
111 Wolfe & Glendening, supra note 42, at 542. 
112 See Drew A. Swank, Non-Attorney Social Security Disability Representatives 
and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 36 S. ILL. U. L.J. 223 (2012)(hereinafter 
Swank, Non-Attorney). 
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parties in SSD hearings.113 A lay advocate is not necessarily 
ineffective when representing a claimant in an adjudicatory 
proceeding. To the contrary, many commentators have suggested 
that non-lawyer representation may be a critical component to 
narrowing the “justice gap” in America – the gap between low and 
moderate income Americans’ needs for legal assistance and their 
ability to obtain such assistance in the current market for legal 
services.114 Nonetheless, it is undeniable that attorneys receive 
training, consisting of a minimum of three years of law school 
education and are tested for basic competency by a state sponsored 
bar examination, in a way that provides at least some quality 
assurance that does not apply to lay advocates. Further, in the case 
of SSD hearings, there are no formal educational or training 
requirements that apply to lay advocates.115 Thus, to the extent 
Judge Frye’s recommended reforms will result in highly trained 
and experienced SSA lawyers facing off against untrained and 
unexamined lay advocates, one can hardly expect the sort of “fair 
fight” that Judge Frye implies will result. 
 With regard to the “justice gap,” some might be surprised to 
know that most SSD claimants are represented at all of their 
hearings. After all, because they are unemployed at the time they 
apply for benefits, and often have been unemployed for years by 
the time of their ALJ hearing, SSD claimants are unlikely able to 
afford a retainer fee to hire an attorney to represent them. 
However, understanding how representatives’ fees are paid out 
following SSD ALJ hearings is critical to understanding why most 
claimants are represented at AJL hearings. Similar examples of 
representation include parties in most tort cases, as opposed to the 
vast majority of parties who go unrepresented regarding most of 
the other types of legal cases that involve low-income litigants.116 
 As previously referenced, if an applicant is successful at the 
                                                          
113 Former SSD ALJ Drew Swank put that figure at between 11 and 14 percent, 
drawing on data from 2006 and 2007. Id. at 234-35 nn. 88-89. There is reason to 
believe that this number has increased in subsequent years. See infra, nn. 123-27 
and accompanying text. 
114 See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING 
THE LEGAL PROFESSION 135 (2000); Tom Lininger, Deregulating Public Interest 
Law, 88 TUL. L. REV. 727, 750, (2014); Daniel C.W. Lang, Note, Utilizing 
Nonlawyer Advocates to Bridge the Justice Gap in America, 17 WIDENER L. 
REV. 289 (2011). 
115 Swank, Non-Attorney, supra note 112, at 239. Non-attorney advocates who 
wish to be paid a fee directly from the claimant’s recovery from the SSA do 
have to pass a test and meet other education and training requirements in order 
to be eligible for direct payment. Id.  
116 See generally, Steven K. Berenson, A Family Law Residency Program?: A 
Modest Proposal In Response to the Burdens Created by Self-Represented 
Litigants in Family Court, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 105, 107-12 (2001). 
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ALJ hearing stage, they could receive benefits retroactive to, near 
to, or even before the original date of their application.117 Given 
the delays in the SSD process, this may result in a payment of three 
or four years’ worth of retroactive benefits. For example, as 
mentioned above, Major waited 42 months between his original 
application date and his ALJ hearing. Even for an SSI claim, where 
the monthly payment amount is around $700, a 41 month 
retroactive payment will result in approximately a $30,000 award 
to the claimant.118 This, of course, is enough of a recovery from 
which to generate a contingent fee significant enough to encourage 
a representative to take on the case on such a basis.119 
 However, before concluding that SSD cases present windfall 
opportunities to lawyers, as is often argued regarding contingent 
fees in tort cases, a closer look at how contingent fees in SSD cases 
work is required. First, contingent fees in SSD cases are generally 
capped at 25% of the amount of the retroactive benefit award.120 
                                                          
117 See supra note 54. 
118 As mentioned above, see supra note 61, any retroactive award to Major 
would have been reduced by the approximately $24,000 in VA benefits that 
Major received during that period. Thus, Major’s retroactive award would have 
been closer to $6,000. 
119 It appears that some of the claimants’ representatives in the NYC scam also 
got paid a percentage or a flat fee out of claimants’ prospective benefits in 
addition to getting their share of the back benefits. O’Carroll Testimony, supra 
note 1, at 4. This was another impermissible aspect of the scam. 
120 Damian Paletta & Dionne Searcey, Two Lawyers Strike Gold in the U.S. 
Disability System, THE WALL ST. J. (Dec. 22, 2011), at 3 (hereinafter, Paletta & 
Searcey, Two Lawyers Strike Gold); Swank, Non-Attorney, supra note 112, at 
243 & n.125; Wolfe & Glendening, supra note 42, at 578. There are actually 
two mutually exclusive ways in which a representative may be paid a fee in an 
SSD case. These are the fee agreement process and the fee petition process. See 
SSA’s Fee Authorization Process, Social Security Website, available at 
http://www.ssa.gov/representation/overview.htm#a0=0&sb=1, last visited 
January 5, 2015. Under the fee agreement process, the claimant and 
representative file a written fee agreement with the SSA prior to a decision 
favorable to the claimant. In such circumstances, the representative’s fee is 
limited to 25% of the retroactive benefit award, or $6,000, whichever is lower. 
See Fee Agreements, Social Security Website, available at 
http://www.ssa.gov/representation/fee_agreements.htm#a0=0, last visited 
January 5, 2015; When Can a Social Security Lawyer Take More than $6000 of 
Your Backpay?, available at http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/when-can-
social-security-disability-lawyer-take-more-than-6000-your-backpay.html, last 
visited January 5, 2015 (hereinafter, Backpay). The vast majority of SSD cases 
that involve a payment of benefits at the ALJ stage involve fee agreements. 
Where no fee agreement is in effect, a representative may be paid pursuant to a 
fee petition. See The Fee Petition Process, Social Security website, available at 
http://www.ssa.gov/representation/fee_petitions.htm#a0=0, last visited January 
5, 2015 (hereinafter Fee Petitions). Fee petitions are most common in two 
situations: 1) where the claimant fired a previous attorney with whom the 
claimant had a fee agreement and the new attorney wishes to be paid (the fee 
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That is in contrast to the typical 1/3 or 40% contingency fees that 
are charged in tort cases that do not settle prior to a hearing. 
Further, there is a cap on the total amount that can be deducted 
from a retroactive award at $6,000.121 Thus, even in the typical SSI 
case discussed above, where a 25% contingent fee of a back pay 
amount of $30,000 would amount to $7,500, the lawyer’s recovery 
will be capped at $6,000. In the typical SSDI case, where the back 
pay amount may be significantly higher,122 the lawyer’s fee will 
nonetheless be capped at $6,000. 
 Reflecting on these numbers, it becomes clear that SSD 
representation will only be cost effective for lawyers if they: 1) 
spend a relatively small amount of time on any given case; 2) 
handle a high volume of cases; and 3) “cherry-pick” cases with a 
high probability of success, and avoid cases with a low probability 
of success (which are unlikely to pay any fee at all). As to the latter 
point, it becomes clear why Major went without legal 
representation for so long across his multiple and most recent SSI 
claims. Claimants with obvious, usually physical injuries are much 
more likely to provide, at least from the lawyer’s perspective – a 
large fee, with relatively little effort involved. By contrast, obscure 
ailments, such as the mental health issues that plague Major, are 
harder to prove, require more effort on the part of lawyers and 
therefore are less cost effective to pursue. Thus, as suggested 
earlier, it is truly the most vulnerable claimants who are the most 
likely to need the assistance, and who are most likely to go 
unrepresented at their ALJ hearings. 
 Given the above-described economics of representation in SSD 
cases, it should not be surprising that it appears that non-attorney 
representation is increasing relative to attorney representation. The 
largest providers of representation in SSD cases are large, national 
firms that rely heavily on non-attorney advocates to represent their 
clients. The largest of these firms is Binder and Binder. The Binder 
firm is well known throughout the country as a result of its heavy 
                                                                                                                                  
must be apportioned between the two attorneys); and 2) where the case proceeds 
beyond the ALJ stage, to the Appeals Council or even to Federal Court. See 
Backpay, supra. In fee petition cases, the SSA determines a fee based on the fair 
value of the services provided by the representative. Id. See also Fee Petitions, 
supra. Because of the greater amount of work involved in cases that go beyond 
the ALJ level, fee awards in fee petition cases may exceed the $6,000 amount. 
See Backpay, supra. However, because, as pointed out earlier, the number of 
claimants plummets at each successive level of review, relatively few cases 
involve fees of these higher amounts. 
121 Paletta & Searcey, Two Lawyers Strike it Rich, supra note 120, at 3. Swank, 
Non-Attorney, supra note 112, at 243 & n.125. 
122 The Wall Street Journal reported that the average SSDI monthly benefit 
amount was a little more than $1,000 in 2009. See Paletta, Insolvency Looms, 
supra note 8, at 2. 
22
DePaul Journal for Social Justice, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 5
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jsj/vol9/iss1/5
DEPAUL JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
Volume 8, Issue 1  Winter 2015 
115 
investment in television advertising.123 In 2010, Binder and Binder 
collected $88 million in representative fees from the SSA.124 Given 
the $6,000 cap in most cases, that adds up to a lot of clients. 
Evidence from a lawsuit with a competitor indicated that Binder 
and Binder represented about 200,000 claimants between 2001 and 
2010.125 Reliance on non-lawyer advocates is a large part of 
Binder’s business model since, such non-attorneys cost less to 
employ than attorneys.126 Similarly, other large national firms such 
as Disability Group, Inc., rely on non-attorney representation as a 
core component of their business models.127 
 Certainly, there are advantages to being represented by a large, 
national organization like Binder and Binder or Disability Group. 
Given the number of cases handled by the firms, it is certain that 
such organizations have developed expertise relating to SSD law, 
as well as economies of scale for handling such cases efficiently 
and effectively. Indeed, both firms offer the testimonials of many 
satisfied clients who were able to obtain SSD benefits with the 
assistance of these firms, often after years of failing to obtain such 
benefits on their own.128 
 On the other hand, the above-described economics of SSD 
practice place tremendous constraints on the amount of time that 
any advocate can spend on most individual SSD cases. Thus, it is 
not uncommon for an advocate to meet their SSD client for the 
first time on the day of their ALJ hearing.129 Sometimes, advocates 
even have to ask SSA personnel to introduce them to their own 
clients immediately prior to the hearing.130 Such advocates often 
know very little about the specifics of their clients’ cases. They 
often question their clients and other witnesses before the ALJ 
using a standard list of questions provided by their employer and 
deliver the same boilerplate closing argument in every case.131 This 
is certainly a far cry from the prevailing lore of the ideal attorney-
client relationship, with lawyers getting to know their clients and 
their clients’ cases on a deeper level and on an individual basis, so 
that the lawyer can provide expert counseling and advocacy that is 
                                                          
123 Paletta & Searcey, Two Lawyers Strike Gold, supra note 120, at 1. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id.  
127 Id. 
128 See BINDER & BINDER, http://www.binderandbinder.com (last visited Jan. 
6, 2015); Testimonials, DISABILITY GROUP, INC., 
http://www.disabilitygroup.com/testimonials.asp (last visited Jan. 6, 2015). 
129 Swank, Non-Attorney, supra note 112, at 223. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
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tailored to the particular circumstances of the client and the case.132 
Thus, the picture that Judge Frye presents in touting a move to an 
adversary system of two experienced and well versed attorneys 
fighting it out in classic adversary hearing mode is not founded in 
reality.  
 There is no doubt that there are many individual lawyer and 
non-lawyer advocates who do an outstanding job on behalf of their 
SSD clients and who put forth the necessary time and effort to 
provide such fruitful representation. Indeed, SSD practice has 
historically been a core component of many legal aid and legal 
services practices, and lawyer and non-lawyer advocates who work 
in these offices usually do not take fees from their clients for such 
representation; therefore, they are largely immune to the economic 
forces described above. But legal aid and legal services offices and 
law school clinics represent a relatively small share of the overall 
pool of SSD applicants. As discussed, it was mere chance that 
Major ended up in a recovery program affiliated with a law school 
clinic. But for that serendipity, Major likely would have headed 
into his ALJ hearing without representation, as he had previously 
when his applications for benefits were denied. 
 Given the inquisitorial nature of SSD hearings, authority 
suggests that attorneys for claimants have a duty to provide all 
relevant information to the ALJ, even if it would be damaging to 
their client.133 As noted, this is inconsistent with a lawyer’s typical 
partisan duties in an adversary system. A move to a full adversary 
system along the lines that Judge Frye advocates would likely 
obviate this duty, and might actually reduce the amount of relevant 
evidence ALJs have on which to base their decisions.  
 For the foregoing reasons, Judge Frye and others have failed to 
make the affirmative case for a change to an adversary SSD 
hearing system. Given the various costs that would be imposed by 
a change to such a system, the burden of proof lies with those who 
would advocate for such a change. It is burden they have failed to 
carry. 
 
III. FRAUD # 3: SOCIAL SECURITY’S VOCATIONAL 
ASSESSMENTS REFLECT THE REAL ECONOMY 
  
SSA ALJ hearings employ a five-step sequential evaluation 
                                                          
132 See generally Steven K. Berenson, From the Ashes of the Lawyer-Statesman 
Rises the Lawyer-Democrat: Practical Legal Wisdom from the Ground Up, 
2014 J. OF THE PROF. LAW. 17, 27. 
133 Robert E. Rains, Professional Responsibility and Social Security 
Representation: The Myth of the State-Bar Bar to Compliance with Federal 
Rules on Production of Adverse Evidence, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 363, 374 (2007).  
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process in determining whether a claimant is disabled.134 First, the 
Judge asks whether the claimant is engaged in “substantial gainful 
activity.”135 If the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful 
activity (SGA), they will be found “not disabled.”136 SGA is 
determined based upon the amount of one’s earnings from 
employment. For 2015, if a sighted person earns more than $1,090 
per month,137 they will be determined to be engaged in SGA and 
will be found not to be disabled. Thus, at the current federal 
minimum wage of $7.25 per hour,138 a person will not be found to 
be disabled if the person who works an average of 35 hours per 
week. If a person makes less than the SGA threshold, they will 
proceed to the second step of the sequential evaluation process.  
 Second, a judge must determine if the claimant has a “’severe’ 
medically determinable mental or physical impairment.”139 Use of 
the term “severe” would seem to imply that a fairly significant 
threshold must be met in order to satisfy this step of the process. In 
fact, however, the medical inquiry at this second stage of the 
disability evaluation process is quite de minimus. According to 
SSD regulations, impairment is severe if it “significantly limit[s]” 
a person’s “mental or physical ability to do basic work 
activities.”140 In practice, virtually any identifiable medical 
condition, whether mental or physical, will be found to rise to the 
level of severity required to allow the claimant to progress to the 
next step of the evaluation process.141  
 The third step represents a major hurdle for claimants, in that it 
                                                          
134 See Frank S. Bloch, Medical Proof, Social Policy, and Social Security’s 
Medically Centered Definition of Disability, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 189, 211 
(2007) (hereinafter, Bloch, Medically Centered); Jon C. Dubin, Overcoming 
Gridlock: Campbell After a Quarter-Century and Bureaucratically Rational 
Gap Filling in Mass Justice Adjudication in the Social Security Administration’s 
Disability Programs, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 937, 972 (2010) (hereinafter, Dubin, 
Gridlock); Dubin, Labor Market, supra note 33, at 50; Griffin, supra note 37, at 
154-55. 
135 Bloch, Medically Centered, supra note 134, at 212; Dubin, Gridlock, supra 
note 134, at 973; Dubin, Labor Market, supra note 33, at 32; Griffin, supra note 
37, at 155; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1571.  
136 Griffin, supra note 37, at 155. 
137 See Substantial Gainful Activity, SSA, 
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/oact/COLA/sga.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2015) 
(“The monthly SGA amount for statutorily blind individuals for 2015 is 
$1,820.”). 
138 Wage and Hour Division, DEP’T OF LABOR, 
http://www.dol.gov/whd/minimumwage.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2014). 
139 Bloch, Medically Centered, supra note 134, at 212. See also Dubin, Gridlock, 
supra note 134, at 973; Dubin, Labor Market, supra note 33, at 32; Griffin, 
supra note 37, at 155. 
140 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521. 
141 Dubin, Gridlock, supra note 134, at 973. 
25
Berenson: The Real Social Security Disability Fraud(s)
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAUL JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
Volume 8, Issue 1  Winter 2015 
118 
asks whether the claimant’s disability rises to the level of one of 
the SSA’s “listing of impairments.”142 The SSA has propounded 
listings of a variety of medical impairments, along with the criteria 
that must be satisfied in order for the listing to be “met.”143 These 
standards for meeting a listing are significantly high.144 The 
standards are set up so that a determination that the claimant meets 
a listing is conclusive as to an inability to work, and therefore a 
claimant who meets a listing is determined to be disabled at this 
step of the evaluation process without regard to the claimant’s age, 
education level or prior work experience, and with no need to 
proceed to the final two steps of the process.145 Even if a 
claimant’s disability does not “meet” a specific listing, if the 
claimant’s disability is “equivalent” to a listing, meaning that “it is 
at least equal in severity and duration to the criteria of any listed 
impairment[,]” the claimant will be found to be disabled at this 
stage of the process.146  
 However, if the claimant’s medical issues are not significant 
enough to rise to the level of meeting or equaling one of the 
listings,147 the ALJ must proceed to the fourth step of the 
evaluation process. This, along with the final step in the process 
explicitly brings the question of vocational assessments into the 
mix, and focuses on the claimant’s residual functional capacity 
(RFC).148 The claimant’s RFC is the claimant’s remaining ability 
to perform certain work functions despite the claimant’s 
impairments.149 The fourth step in the evaluation process asks 
whether, given the claimant’s RFC, the claimant can return to her 
                                                          
142 Bloch, Medically Centered, supra note 134, at 212; Dubin, Gridlock, supra 
note 134, at 973-74; Dubin, Labor Market, supra note 33, at 32-33; Griffin, 
supra note 37, at 155. 
143 Listing of impairments, SSA 
http://www.ssa.gov/disability/professionals/bluebook/AdultListings.htm (last 
visited Mar. 24, 2014). 
144 Dubin, Gridlock, supra note 134, at 974; Dubin, Labor Market, supra note 
33, at 33. 
145 Id. 
146 See BLOCH ON SOCIAL SECURITY § 3:26, quoting 20 C.F.R. §§ 
404.1526(a), 416.926(a). 
147 Multiple impairments can be aggregated so that even if no one impairment 
alone meets a listing, the cumulative effect may be equivalent to a listing and 
thus may result in a finding of disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.923.  
148 Bloch, Medically Centered, supra note 134, at 213; Dubin, Gridlock, supra 
note 134, at 974; Dubin, Labor Market, supra note 33, at 33; Griffin, supra note 
37, at 156. 
149 Bloch, Medically Centered, supra note 134, at 213; Dubin, Gridlock, supra 
note 134, at 974; Dubin, Labor Market, supra note 33, at 33; Griffin, supra note 
37, at 156. 
26
DePaul Journal for Social Justice, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 5
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jsj/vol9/iss1/5
DEPAUL JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
Volume 8, Issue 1  Winter 2015 
119 
prior work.150 If the answer to this is yes, the claimant is not 
disabled, because by definition they should be able to return to 
prior work and the ALJ does not proceed to step five.151 However, 
if the answer is no, then the final step in the evaluation asks 
whether, based on the claimant’s RFC, their age, education level 
and prior work experience, they can perform any job available in 
significant numbers in the national economy.152 If the answer to 
this question is yes, then the claimant is not disabled.153  
 These final two steps of the evaluation process are to a large 
degree mandated by the language of the Social Security Act itself. 
The Act states: 
An individual shall be determined to be under a 
disability only if his physical or mental impairment 
or impairments are of such severity that he is not 
only unable to do his previous work but cannot, 
considering his age, education, and work 
experience, engage in any other kind of substantial 
gainful work which exists in the national economy, 
regardless of whether such work exists in the 
immediate area in which he lives, or whether a 
specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he 
would be hired if he applied for work.154 
The 1967 Social Security Amendments added the provision to the 
Act.155 For the first time, this language made explicit the mandate 
that a vocational assessment is a necessary part of the disability 
determination process.156 One key to the determination of 
disability at the final stage of the process is the Medical Vocational 
Disability Guidelines, or Grids promulgated by the SSA.157 The 
Grids are a series of tables that specify, given the claimant’s RFC, 
their age, level of education and prior work experience, whether a 
                                                          
150 Bloch, Medically Centered, supra note 134, at 213; Dubin, Gridlock, supra 
note 134, at 975; Dubin, Labor Market, supra note 33, at 34; Griffin, supra note 
37, at 156. 
151 Bloch, Medically Centered, supra note 134, at 213; Dubin, Gridlock, supra 
note 134, at 975; Dubin, Labor Market, supra note 33, at 34; Griffin, supra note 
37, at 156. 
152 Bloch, Medically Centered, supra note 134, at 213; Dubin, Gridlock, supra 
note 134, at 976; Dubin, Labor Market, supra note 33, at 34; Griffin, supra note 
37, at 156. 
153 Bloch, Medically Centered, supra note 134, at 213; Dubin, Gridlock, supra 
note 134, at 975; Dubin, Labor Market, supra note 33, at 34; Griffin, supra note 
37, at 156. 
154 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(2)(A) (2006). 
155 Dubin, Gridlock, supra note 134, at 948; Dubin, Labor Market, supra note 
33, at 23-24. 
156 Dubin, Gridlock, supra note 134, at 948; Dubin, Labor Market, supra note 
33, at 25. 
157 Bloch, Medically Centered, supra note 134 on Social Security § 3:31. 
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sufficient number of jobs exist in the national economy to satisfy 
the statutory standard set forth above for determining a person not 
to be disabled.158 
 A look at how the grids applied in Major’s case will clarify 
their use. A claimant’s physical RFC is a determination of their 
strength related capacity to engage in activities that may be 
required of certain occupations, including the ability to sit or stand 
for specified durations of time, and the ability to walk, lift, carry, 
push or pull certain amounts of weight.159 Various combinations of 
different ability levels with regard to each of these tasks are taken 
to describe the ability to perform different types of work. Thus, a 
person is deemed able to perform sedentary work if the person can 
sit for up to six hours in an eight hour work day, stand and walk for 
up to two hours and lift up to ten pounds occasionally.160 “Light 
work involves standing and walking for up to six hours and lifting 
up to twenty pounds with pushing and pulling of arm and leg 
controls while seated; medium work is light work with lifting up to 
fifty pounds; heavy and very heavy work involves lifting up to or 
over one hundred pounds, respectively.”161  
 In an RFC assessment of Major performed by a SSA contracted 
physician, it was determined that Major can lift up to ten pounds 
frequently, and up to 20 pounds occasionally. It was also 
determined that he can both sit and stand or walk for up to six 
hours out of an eight hour day. Such assessments lead to the 
conclusion that Major is able to do light work. However, the RFC 
assessment also concluded that Major’s ability to push and/or pull 
with his lower extremities was limited due to chronic left heel pain 
with possible Reflex Sympathy Dystrophy. This suggested a 
finding that Major would be limited to sedentary work. However, 
as will be discussed in greater detail below, the ALJ at Major’s 
hearing chose to disregard the SSA contracted doctor’s assessment 
of Major’s lower extremity limitations, and treated Major as being 
able to perform light work. 
 Turning to the grid for light work,162 Major’s status as disabled 
or not disabled would be determined by his age, education level 
and prior work experience.163 Given Major’s age of 49 at the time 
                                                          
158 Bloch, Medically Centered, supra note 134, at 217; Dubin, Gridlock, supra 
note 134, at 976; Dubin, Labor Market, supra note 33, at 35. 
159 Dubin, Gridlock, supra note 134, at 974-75; Dubin, Labor Market, supra 
note 33, at 33. 
160 Dubin, Gridlock, supra note 134, at 975 n.149. 
161 Id. 
162 20 C.F.R. Part 404 Subpart P Appx 2 (Guidelines) § 202, available at 
http://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/cfr20/404/404-app-p02.htm, last visited July 1, 
2014. 
163 Dubin, Labor Market, supra note 33, at 36. 
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of the hearing (considered a “younger individual” under the grids’ 
parlance),164 and given his high school diploma, he would be 
considered not disabled under the grids regardless of his prior work 
experience.165 Note that the result would have been the same under 
the grids had the ALJ determined that the “sedentary work” grid 
should be used.166 On the other hand, under the sedentary work 
grid, if Major’s hearing had been delayed by approximately four 
months until after he turned 50, then the sedentary grid would 
result in a finding of disabled.167   
 The grids add an element of certainty to what was previously 
an extremely variable process. Between promulgation of the Social 
Security Act Amendments in 1967, and adoption of the grids in 
1978, the now mandatory vocational assessment performed as part 
of the disability determination involved an often inconsistent 
application of the official notice doctrine, as applied to certain U.S. 
Department of Labor publications, and the use of vocational expert 
testimony at ALJ hearings.168 
 Nonetheless, at least two serious problems result from current 
usage of the grids in disability determinations. First, the grids only 
assess exertional limitations on employability.169 However, an 
increasingly large percentage of SSD cases involve non-exertional 
limitations, including mental health issues, in addition to exertional 
ones.170 Pain is another prominent non-exertional limitation that 
may impact a claimant’s ability to work, which is not addressed by 
the grids.171 Thus, vocational evidence beyond the grids is required 
in cases involving such non-exertional limitations.  
 Second, the grids are based on grossly outdated data derived 
from an economy that bears little resemblance to the current one. 
When the grids were promulgated in 1978, they were based largely 
upon data from the United States Department of Labor’s 1965 
                                                          
164 See Swank, Five Small Steps, supra note 62, at 160. 
165 20 C.F.R. Part 404 Subpart P Appx 2 (Guidelines) § 202.20, available at 
http://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/cfr20/404/404-app-p02.htm, last visited July 1, 
2014. 
166 20 C.F.R. Part 404 Subpart P Appx 2 (Guidelines) § 201.27, available at 
http://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/cfr20/404/404-app-p02.htm, last visited July 1, 
2014. 
167 20 C.F.R. Part 404 Subpart P Appx 2 (Guidelines) § 201.12, available at 
http://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/cfr20/404/404-app-p02.htm, last visited July 1, 
2014. 
168 Dubin, Gridlock, supra note 134, at 950-71. 
169 Dubin, Gridlock, supra note 134, at 976; Nathaniel O. Hubley, Note, The 
Untouchables: Why a Vocational Expert’s Testimony in Social Security 
Disability Hearings Cannot be Touched, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 353, 375 (2008). 
170 Dubin, Gridlock, supra note 33, at 943. 
171 Id. 
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Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT).172 The grids have not 
been updated since that time. In the words of scholar Jon Dubin: 
The grid continues to rely on woefully outdated 
assumptions drawn from a snapshot of the United 
States' economy nearly a half-century ago. It has not 
been meaningfully updated to account for dramatic 
changes in today's dynamic and fluid twenty-first-
century economy and labor market.173 
Aside from the question of staleness, other scholars have 
questioned the validity of the information relied upon by the SSA 
in creating the grids, even when that information was timely.174   
 In cases where the grids are not determinative, ALJs often rely 
on the testimony of vocational experts (VE’s).175 However, 
presently, no generally accepted standards exist to determine who 
qualifies as a VE in terms of training, experience or supervision.176 
Moreover, it is unclear whether the methods employed in the 
relatively new field of vocational studies rise to a level of 
reliability that warrants the degree of deference ALJs accord to VE 
testimony.177 Indeed, VE testimony often relies largely on the same 
outdated DOT data that underlies the grids.178 At least one writer 
has persuasively argued that the same VE testimony that is relied 
on in SSD hearings would be inadmissible in most courts under the 
prevailing Daubert test for the admissibility of expert testimony.179 
 The national focus of SSD’s vocational assessment phase also 
seems misguided. As quoted above,180 the Social Security Act 
requires a person to be found not to be disabled if there are a 
sufficient number of jobs the person can perform in the national 
economy, even if no such jobs exist in the region or locality in 
which the claimant resides. Yet disabled individuals with no 
income generally lack the means to relocate to another part of the 
country for a job that is not available in their locality. 
 Another significant problem with the vocational aspect of the 
SSD system is its “all or nothing nature.” Even a claimant who is 
found to be disabled, but only eligible to receive SSI benefits, can 
look forward to an income stream that is minimally adequate on 
                                                          
172 Dubin, Labor Market, supra note 33, at 2-3. 
173 Dubin, Labor Market, supra note 33, at 4.  
174 Dubin, Labor Market, supra note 33, at 4-5. 
175 See Hubley, supra note 169, at 375. 
176 Dubin, Labor Market, supra note 33, at 968; Hubley, supra note 169, at 355. 
177 Hubley, supra note 169, at 355. Id. 
178 Id. at 369-70. 
179 Id. at 396. 
180 See supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
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which to survive, along with health insurance.181 On the other 
hand, an unsuccessful claimant is left largely on her own to find a 
job with little if any assistance from the federal government.182 If 
this is the result following an ALJ decision, by this time the 
claimant has likely been out of the work force for a period of years, 
because working while the claim was pending would likely have 
jeopardized the applicant’s chances of success.183 The challenge 
for a person with at least some level of disability to return to the 
workforce after a lengthy absence with little government assistance 
is especially daunting.184 
 Scholars point out the tension between the SSD program’s 
recognition that certain people should be excused from the general 
social obligation to work to support oneself as a result of disability, 
and the Americans with Disabilities Act’s premise that persons 
with disabilities have historically been discriminated against in 
employment markets, and that such persons often are able and 
willing to work given appropriate accommodations from 
employers.185 While the SSA does offer a small number of 
programs to help to encourage SSD recipients to return to the 
workforce,186 few beneficiaries actually take advantage of these 
programs.187 Moreover, because the SSD system is funded through 
                                                          
181 SSI recipients’ income is sufficiently low that most also qualify for the 
Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program (SNAP), formerly known as Food 
Stamps. See United States Department of Agriculture webpage at 
http://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/eligibility, last visited July 29, 2014.  
182 States and localities do offer a patchwork of vocational rehabilitation 
programs designed to assist persons with disabilities to obtain employment. See 
David Wittenburg, David R. Mann & Allison Thompson, The Disability System 
and Programs to Promote Employment for People With Disabilities (2013), 
available at http://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/2193-9004-2-4/fulltext.html, 
last visited August 12, 2014. However, the disjointed nature of such programs 
serves to limit greatly their effectiveness. Id. at 3. 
183 Gregory Acs, Responding to Long-Term Unemployment 5 (Urban Institute 
Paper 2013), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412888-
responding-to-long-term-unemployment.pdf, last visited July 30, 2014; David 
H. Autor, The Unsustainable Rise of the Disability Rolls in the United States: 
Causes, Consequences and Policy Options, 9-10 (MIT Working Paper, Nov. 
2011) (hereinafter Autor, Unsustainable), available at 
http://economics.mit.edu/files/7388, last visited July 29, 2014. 
184 Id. 
185 See, e.g, Id. at 5; Edward Berkowitz, Implications for Income Maintenance 
Policy, in Implementing the Americans with Disabilities Act 193, 195 (Jane 
West Ed. 1996); Matthew Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies: The Tensions 
Between the Americans With Disabilities Act and Federal Disability Benefis 
Programs, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1003, 1059-75 (1998); Dubin, Labor Market Side, 
supra note 33, at 59 & n. 245.  
186 See Autor, Unsustainable, supra note 183, at 12 (discussing the Ticket to 
Work program); Morton, supra note 62, at 333. 
187 Id.  
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a non-experience rated payroll tax,188 this offers a perverse 
incentive for employers not to provide significant workplace 
accommodations and other assistance to help disabled adults to 
stay in the workforce, rather than to leave employment and seek 
SSD benefits.189 
   Over the decades since the grids were adopted, the United 
States’ economy has transformed from a manufacturing based 
economy to a service and knowledge based one. In some sense, the 
lessened need for physical labor has increased the opportunities for 
disabled persons to participate in the labor force.190 Indeed, some 
argue that the decreased need for physical labor should result in 
fewer favorable disability determinations rather than the trend 
toward increased disability findings in recent years.191 However, 
the educational requirements for such jobs, as well as the need to 
adapt to rapid technological changes have left many disabled 
persons, particularly those with cognitive impairments, left behind. 
 Indeed, there is a broad consensus that the economic crisis of 
2008, along with longer term structural changes to the American 
economy, placed great strains upon the SSD system, in terms of 
large increases in the number of persons applying for benefits, the 
number of persons receiving such benefits and the corresponding 
fiscal soundness of the system.192 According to a recent 
Congressional Research Service study, SSDI applications 
increased by 27.3% during the most recent recession (December 
2007 – June 2009).193 The fact is that the SSD system is being 
called on to provide a “social safety net” for a proportion of the 
population far beyond that which was anticipated when the 
program was created.  
 Part of the reason for the current strains on the SSD system is 
the inadequacy of the rest of the “social safety net” for many of 
those who have recently applied for SSD benefits. For someone 
                                                          
188 Simply stated, experience rating is a method of setting insurance premiums 
based upon the insured’s claims history. See J.F. Follman, Jr., Experience Rating 
v. Community Rating,  29 THE J. OF INSURANCE 403, 403 (1962) (citations 
omitted). Thus, automobile insurance polies are experienced rated: the more 
accidents you have, the higher your premiums. By contrast, employers pay the 
same percentage of each employee’s wages in SSD taxes regardless of how 
many of the employer’s employees file claims for SSD benefits. If employers 
could lower their SSD payments by keeping more of their employees on the job, 
they might make greater efforts to do so.  
189 Autor, Unsustainable, supra note 183, at 8. 
190 Id. at 2. 
191 Id. 
192 See, e.g., Swank, Five Small Steps, supra note 62, at 155. See also Morton, 
supra note 62, at 13 & n.70 (2013) (citing studies showing positive correlation 
between unemployment rate and SSDI application rate). 
193 Id. at 13-14. 
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who lost her job due to the 2008 recession, outsourcing or 
technological change in his or her field, Unemployment Insurance 
(UI) is generally the first place to turn for immediate assistance. 
While the government extended the number of weeks one can 
collect UI benefits in the wake of the 2008 recession, at present, 
one can receive UI benefits for a total of up to 46 weeks, the same 
duration that was in effect prior to the 2008 recession.194 Naturally, 
it makes sense that one might apply for SSD benefits after one has 
exhausted their UI benefits,195 particularly given that there are 
virtually no other income support programs available for anyone 
other than very poor persons with minor children.196 
 Many blame the failures of our country’s K-12 education 
system for the difficulties unemployed workers have had in 
adjusting to the demands of our new economy. Such a critique is 
beyond the scope of our present inquiry. However, others connect 
these shortcomings and our rapidly changing economy to the need 
to develop a more robust system for offering job retraining and 
                                                          
194 See generally Maria Canon & Yang Liu, The Effects of Extending 
Unemployment Insurance Benefits , ECONOMIC SYNOPSES (2014), available at 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/es/14/ES_16_2014-07-03.pdf, last 
visited July 7, 2014; Jesse Rothstein, Unemployment Insurance and Job Search 
in the Great Recession, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2013, pp. 
143-210, available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/about/projects/bpea/editions/~/media/Projects/ 
BPEA/Fall%202011/2011b_bpea_rothstein.PDF, last visited July 7, 2014.  
195 At least one researcher has found that extensions in the availability of UI 
benefits tend to delay applications for SSD, which in turn saves the SSD 
program money, both in the short term, because potential applicants receive UI 
rather than SSD benefits, but also in the long term, because some potential SSD 
applicants find jobs during the extended period of UI benefits. See Matthew S. 
Rutledge, The Impact of Unemployment Insurance Extensions on Disability 
Insurance Application and Allowance Rates (Center for Retirement Research at 
Boston College 2011), available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2011/10/wp_2011-17-508.pdf, last visited July 30, 2014. 
196 People with minor children might be eligible for the Temporary Assistance to 
Needy Families Program. See generally www.tanfprogram.com, last visited July 
7, 2014. Even if ineligible for TANF, very poor individuals will likely qualify 
for Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program (SNAP), formerly known as 
food stamps. However, SNAP benefits were only $189 per month for a single 
person as of 2014. See United States Department of Agriculture webpage at 
http://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/eligibility, last visited July 7, 2014. Another 
major inducement to apply for SSD benefits came from the fact that those 
awarded benefits were also granted health care benefits under the Medicare or 
Medicaid program. See Morton, supra note 60, at 16. While this inducement 
may be lessened by the Affordable Care Act’s extension of Medicaid benefits 
and other low cost health insurance options to many who were previously 
ineligible for benefits, id., many states have declined to accept the federal 
government’s offer of funding to extend their Medicaid programs. Thus, the 
ultimate impact of the ACA on the lure to apply for SSD in order to obtain 
health care coverage remains uncertain. Id.  
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placement services to the long term unemployed and those with 
mild to moderate disabilities,197 who are leading candidates to 
apply for SSD without other alternatives to provide income. In any 
event, it seems clear that the SSD program is increasingly being 
called upon to provide a “social safety net” for displaced workers, 
rather than its initial purpose of providing an insurance program 
for medical impairments.198 
 
IV.  MAJOR’S CASE 
  
 A closer look at Major’s case will further illustrate the fallacy 
of the above-described myths, as well as highlight the need for 
reform to the SSD system. First, the denial of benefits in Major’s 
case silences the myth that it is easy to get SSD benefits. Major has 
not received a paycheck in nearly 20 years. He has been diagnosed 
by licensed medical doctors with at least the following mental 
conditions in addition to his physical limitations: Depression, Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder, Anxiety Disorder, Personality Disorder 
and Substance Abuse Disorder. He has been involuntarily 
committed to inpatient hospitals following suicide attempts on 
multiple occasions. The VA has determined that his military 
service-connected disabilities limit his earning capacity by 80%, 
which is to say nothing about his non-service connected 
disabilities. Major was homeless and living on the streets for an 
extended period of time prior to his entry in his current 
rehabilitation program. If Major’s circumstances are not enough to 
qualify him for disability benefits, it is clearly erroneous to 
describe obtaining such benefits as easy. 
 It is also clear that the fact that Major was represented by 
counsel at the ALJ hearing did not result in the Agency being 
“overmatched,” or an unfair process in Major’s favor. It is true that 
Major’s actual advocate at his hearing was a law student rather 
than a lawyer. But, for reasons discussed above,199 representation 
at the ALJ hearing by a non-lawyer, acting under the supervision 
of an attorney seems to be the new norm at ALJ hearings. Also, 
while the supervising attorney in Major’s case lacked extensive 
experience in SSD litigation, I was involved in a few prior such 
cases, and brought more than 25 years of legal practice and 
poverty-law practice experience to the case.   
 Also, as mentioned earlier,200 at the time our clinic agreed to 
take Major’s case, with only a week or so to go before his 
                                                          
197 See, e.g., Wittenburg, Mann, & Thompkins, supra note 182. 
198 Autor & Duggan, supra note 66, at 87. 
199 See supra notes 123-27, and accompanying text. 
200 See supra page 5. 
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scheduled hearing, the SSA had utterly failed in its duty to develop 
a full record to base a decision on.201 All that was contained in the 
SSA file were medical records from the local VA for about a year 
from the date of Major’s application in late 2010, through the end 
of 2011. Thus, the first task that our clinic undertook after getting 
Major’s hearing continued was to collect the records from Major’s 
numerous hospitalizations and other medical treatment over the 
past decade. We knew that Major had been hospitalized at least 
several times following suicide attempts, and that such attempts 
were factors that could contribute to a finding that Major met a 
listing for an affective disorder under section 12.04 of the listings 
of impairments.202 Eventually, we were able to compile and submit 
more than 1,000 pages of medical records, the volume of which 
caused the ALJ, acting sua sponte, to continue the hearing for 
another two months to allow him to review this evidence.203 
 Another task the clinic undertook in order to prepare the case 
for hearing was to contact Major’s treating medical providers to 
provide opinion letters about Major’s impairments. Although 
Major had a physical RFC assessment by an SSA contracted doctor 
in the lead up to his case,204 Major had not received notice of a 
scheduled SSA psychiatric evaluation due to his homelessness. 
Thus, there was no specific mental health evaluation included in 
the SSA’s work-up of the case. Opinions from treating doctors 
may be particularly important in the SSD process because their 
opinions are, by rule, entitled to greater weight than the SSA’s own 
doctors, who have only examined the applicant once for purposes 
of the SSD claim, and even greater weight than a testifying 
medical expert at the ALJ hearing, who has likely only conducted a 
paper review of the claimant’s case, and has not examined the 
claimant directly.205 
 Working with Major’s treating doctors proved to be a 
challenge, as it often is in SSD cases. Busy doctors naturally prefer 
to spend as much of their time treating patients as is possible, and 
                                                          
201 SSD experts Frank Bloch, Jeffrey Lubbers, and Paul Verkuil have contended 
that failure to develop a full record on which to decide cases is one of the 
greatest failings of the SSD adjudication system. See Bloch, et al., Full and 
Fair, supra note 67, at 53. However, rather than recommending adversarial 
attorney representation for the SSA as Judge Frye and others have, Bloch, 
Lubbers, and Verkuil have proposed adding a non-adversary, SSA “Counselor” 
to the hearing process whose primary role would be to ensure that the ALJ has a 
complete record upon which to base her decision. Id. at 60.  
202 See supra note 143. 
203 Carina Weng also points out that many low income SSD applicants, who 
have not had regular access to health care, may lack medical records to 
document clear disabilities.  
204 See supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text. 
205 BLOCH ON SOCIAL SECURITY §§ 5:7- 5:8. 
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little time writing letters or preparing documents for administrative 
purposes. Major regularly saw both a psychiatrist and a 
psychologist at the VA, as well as a primary care physician. 
Doctors are often particularly overwhelmed by the volume of 
patients they are required to treat in public settings such as the VA. 
Furthermore, delays and other problems within the VA health care 
system were very much in the news during the period relevant to 
Major’s case.206 
 From a lawyer’s perspective, a letter from a doctor is most 
effective when it refers to specific evidence from the applicant’s 
treatment records, and then connects that evidence to particular 
requirements of the SSA Listings. Indeed, many lawyers likely 
prefer to sketch out a first draft of such a letter themselves for the 
treating physician to review, edit and finalize. By contrast, many 
doctors are reluctant to sign a letter drafted for them by an 
attorney. While such doctors would prefer to draft their own 
letters, they often lack the resources, both in terms of time and 
ability to connect medical facts to relevant legal standards, or to 
write such assessments in a comprehensible way, like lawyers. 
Each of these limitations occurred with Major’s VA doctors. At the 
end of the day, we were required to settle for letters that amounted 
to little more than conclusory listings of the various mental and 
physical conditions Major was diagnosed with. While this was 
certainly enough in itself to get Major past the second step of the 
sequential evaluation process, there was little in these letters to 
help an ALJ find evidence that Major’s impairments met or 
exceeded a listing. 
 Fortunately, Major was also receiving treatment from both a 
licensed clinical social worker at his rehabilitation program, as 
well as an acupuncturist. Because these professionals were more 
willing to work with Major’s lawyers in drafting letters for 
submission to the ALJ on Major’s behalf, their letters did a better 
job of connecting medical evidence of record to the Listings. 
However, because these professionals are not medical doctors, 
their opinions hold less weight than those of the SSA doctors, and 
the testifying medical expert, even though the letter writers had 
treated the applicant, and the other doctors had not.207 
 Additionally, we were able to have an assessment of Major 
performed by a psychologist who had volunteered his services 
through the Give an Hour program. This program allows service 
                                                          
206 See, e.g., Severe Report Finds V.A. Hid Waiting Lists, NEW YORK TIMES,  
May 29, 2014, at A1 (discussing VA Inspector General’s Report regarding 
significant delays in providing medical care at Phoenix VA hospital and efforts 
made to cover up the fact of such delays). 
207 See generally BLOCH ON SOCIAL SECURITY § 5:7. 
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providers to offer free services to needy veterans.208 Though this 
professional’s letter also did a thorough job of connecting his 
observations of Major’s symptoms to the Listings, it will hold less 
weight because of the fact that it was not offered by a professional 
who had regularly treated Major. 
 When one lawyer asks another lawyer about a case they are 
handling, the first question the lawyer always asks is: “Who is the 
judge?” That question may be even more pertinent in the case of 
SSD ALJ hearings than other types of proceedings. The overall 
success rate of claimants at the ALJ stage – 56% in 2013209 - 
masks huge disparities in the allowance rate of claims by different 
SSD ALJs. For example, in 2011, the Wall Street Journal reported 
that dozens of ALJs nationwide awarded benefits in more than 
90% of their cases, while many others awarded benefits in fewer 
than 20% of their cases.210 In such circumstances, luck of the draw 
can make a huge difference. In Major’s case, the Judge ultimately 
assigned to the matter denied approximately 42% of the cases he 
heard during the most recent fiscal year,211 right about the average 
for all ALJs according to the Wall Street Journal.212  
 Substance abuse turned out to be a huge issue in Major’s case. 
Since the enactment of “welfare reform” in 1996, substance abuse, 
in and of itself, is not considered a disability that entitles one to 
receive SSD benefits, even if it prevents a person from working.213 
Moreover, even if the claimant can prove a disability other than 
substance abuse, benefits will be denied if substance abuse is 
determined to be a “contributing factor material to the 
determination of disability.”214 The medical expert in Major’s case 
testified that while it was arguable in his opinion whether Major’s 
mental health issues met at least some of the listings when Major 
was abusing alcohol and drugs, he was convinced that when sober, 
Major’s mental health issues did not rise to the level of meeting 
any of the listings. The Judge placed great weight on this 
testimony, and ultimately reached the same conclusion, that Major 
only met the listings when abusing alcohol or drugs, at which time 
a finding of disability would be precluded due to the substance 
abuse. 
                                                          
208 See GIVE AN HOUR (giveanhour.org, last visited July 25, 2014), 
http://www.giveanhour.org. 
209 See supra note 35. 
210 Id. 
211 See supra note 39. 
212 See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
213 Warnecke Millar & Rebecca Griffin, Recent Development, Adjudicating 
Addicts: Social Security Disability, the Failure to Adequately Address Substance 
Abuse, and Proposals for Change, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 967, 968-69 (2012). 
214 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.935(a), 404.1535(a). 
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 Because the Judge found that Major did not meet a listing, it 
was necessary to move to the vocational aspect of the sequential 
evaluation process. This is where the third myth addressed above, 
that the SSD system makes genuine assessments of a person’s 
ability to work, was proven false. The SSA’s records indicated that 
Major had not received any reported earnings from employment 
since his discharge from the military nearly 20 years ago. At the 
hearing, Major testified that he had worked as a “ranch hand,” 
during this period, a position that Major had confided in his 
attorneys amounted to little more than being a “gigolo” for a 
wealthy ranch owner. In any event, given Major’s RFC as 
described above, the Judge and the vocational expert agreed that 
Major would not be capable of returning to his prior employment 
as a “ranch hand.” The Judge then asked the vocational expert a 
hypothetical question designed to determine whether there were 
jobs in the national economy in sufficient numbers for a person 
with Major’s RFC. The vocational expert responded by identifying 
three such jobs: eyedropper assembler,215 addresser216 and 
document preparer.217 
 When the Judge modified his hypothetical to include the 
additional limitations recognized by the SSA’s examining doctor 
based upon Major’s lower extremity problems,218 the vocational 
expert concluded that there would be no jobs in the national 
economy in sufficient numbers that Major would be able to 
perform. Despite this testimony, the Judge ultimately rejected the 
SSA’s own doctor’s conclusions regarding Major’s lower 
extremity limitations, and found Major not to be disabled. 
 Major appealed the ALJ’s decision to the SSA Appeals 
Council. It seemed that he had a number of solid issues to raise on 
appeal. One was that the Judge erred in disregarding literally all of 
the expert opinions provided on Major’s behalf, on grounds that 
they were inconsistent with the Judge’s ultimate conclusion that 
Major’s mental health disabilities did not raise to the level of a 
                                                          
215 According to the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT), an eyedropper 
assembler “slips rubber bulbs over ends of glass tubes to form eyedroppers.”  
See DOT 739.687-086, available at 
http://www.occupationalinfo.org/73/739687086.html, last visited July 11, 2014. 
216 According to DOT 209.587-010, available at 
http://www.occupationalinfo.org/20/209587010.html, last visited July 11, 2014, 
an addresser “[a]ddresses by hand or typewriter, envelopes, cards, advertising 
literature, packages, and similar items for mailing.” 
217 According to DOT 249.587-018, available at 
http://www.occupationalinfo.org/24/249587018.html, last visited July 11, 2014, 
a document preparer “[p]repares documents, such as brochures, pamphlets, and 
catalogs, for microfilming, using paper cutter, photocopying machine, rubber 
stamps, and other work devices … .” 
218 See supra notes 159-163 and accompanying text. 
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listing in the absence of substance abuse. It certainly seems to “put 
the cart before the horse” to disregard an opinion as being 
inconsistent with the judge’s ultimate conclusion. Shouldn’t the 
opinion be considered first in reaching the conclusion, or be 
disregarded as unreliable on other grounds? Further, the Judge’s 
sole reliance on the testifying expert seemed to disregard SSA 
policies regarding the weight to be assigned to the opinions of 
treating and examining doctors, as opposed to those who have 
never met the claimant.219 
 Additionally, the Judge’s disregard of the findings of SSA’s 
own examining doctor relating to additional functional limitations 
also seemed suspect. There appears to be no basis upon which to 
distinguish between that doctor’s conclusions as to Major’s 
abilities to sit, walk, lift, stand, etc., which the Judge credited, and 
the other findings regarding Major’s lower extremity limitations, 
which the Judge rejected.220 
 Despite these arguments, the Appeals Council denied Major’s 
appeal within days of its submission. This was rather shocking, 
given the typically long wait times prior to receiving an Appeals 
Council decision.221 Major has now filed for federal court review 
of his SSD denial. However, the scope of review of SSD decisions 
in federal court is relatively narrow. The court must uphold the 
SSA decision as long as there is substantial evidence in the record 
to support its conclusion, even if the greater weight of the evidence 
would require a decision to the contrary.222  
 The decision to reject Major’s disability application on the 
basis that he is not disabled is most objectionable because it is 
unrealistic to assert that people with physical limitations, 
depression, PTSD and personality disorders can readily find 
employment assembling eyedroppers, addressing envelopes or 
cutting up documents for microfilming. In reality, these jobs 
simply do not exist, and even if the jobs did exist, no employer 
would be likely to offer a job to Major performing one of these 
tasks. To a certain extent, Major’s individual lack of employability 
is rendered irrelevant to the SSD process by the statutory language 
that states whether a particular person would actually be hired for a 
job available in sufficient numbers in the National economy is 
irrelevant to the disability determination. However, it is just this 
type of fictitious determination that cries out for reform of the 
system. 
                                                          
219 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). 
220 The opinions of a physician who has examined the claimant are also 
supposed to be given greater weight than those of a doctor who has not 
examined the claimant. Id. at § 404.1527(c)(1). 
221 See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
222 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Bloch on Social Security § 6:2. 
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V.  SUGGESTED REFORMS 
 
 The foregoing discussion serves to refute the three SSD frauds 
addressed here. First, it is far from easy for most claimants to 
obtain SSD benefits. The frauds perpetrated in New York are 
certainly galling, but there is little evidence to suggest that frauds 
on this scale are a frequent occurrence throughout the system. The 
statistics discussed in Part I of this paper make clear that most 
applications for SSD benefits are unsuccessful, and that even 
successful claimants often must endure lengthy delays and 
complicated procedural hurdles before their claims are approved. 
Moreover, there is reason to believe that it is often the most 
vulnerable claimants who suffer the most from the lengthy and 
complex SSD application process. Certainly efforts should be 
made to investigate, punish and deter fraudulent claims. But 
restricting access to the system other than through a review of 
substantive eligibility standards will likely hurt the most vulnerable 
applicants to the greatest degree, and defeat the objectives that 
supported adoption of the disability program in the first place. 
 Similarly, there is no empirical evidence whatsoever that 
providing the SSA with its own attorneys would improve outcomes 
in SSD cases, at least in terms of obtaining more accurate results. 
We do know that a major transition from the current inquisitorial 
system to an adversary system would impose significant 
transaction costs on an already financially strapped system. 
Moreover, paying a whole new staff of SSA attorneys going 
forward would impose similar additional costs on the 
Administration. Without any solid proof that the system would be 
improved, these costs are unwarranted. Rather, as a classic “repeat 
player,” the Administration holds significant systemic advantages 
over the “one-shotter” claimants in SSD hearings. This is true even 
in cases of represented claimants. The representation that claimants 
receive often falls short of the high quality legal representation that 
would no doubt be afforded to the SSA if it were to employ 
attorneys to represent it in all cases. Thus, providing attorney 
representation to the SSA would only serve to exacerbate the 
advantages the Administration currently has in SSD hearings. 
 Unlike the first two SSD frauds previously rebutted, the third 
fraud, that the SSD adjudication system involves a bona fide and 
reliable vocational assessment, calls for change to the current 
system. There is little dispute that the fourth and fifth stages of the 
SSA’s five step sequential evaluation process rely on grossly 
outdated data that was of questionable validity even when it was 
current. Further, in lieu of reliable statistical data, the opinions of 
the so-called vocational “experts” who testify in the absence of 
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such data lack the reliability we demand of expert testimony in 
other adjudicatory contexts. Any system that can honestly 
conclude that Major, despite all of his ailments, can obtain gainful 
employment assembling eyedroppers is a system in serious need of 
reform.  
 Rutgers-Newark law professor Jon Dubin has been perhaps the 
most articulate scholar with regard to both understanding and 
critiquing the current SSD system in general,223 and the vocational 
aspects of the system in particular.224 Dubin advocates for a “mend 
it don’t end it” approach by which the grids would be updated and 
improved, but not dispensed of entirely, while recognizing the 
significant limitations of the grids, including the staleness of the 
data on which grids are based, and the inability to fully establish 
the outcome in cases involving non-exertional limitations.225 
 However, Dubin’s writings, which are now a few years’ old, 
fail to adequately account for the political and economic pressures 
on the SSD system that have continued to grow along with the size 
and cost of the applicant pool and disability rolls in light of the 
2008 economic crises and the continuing rapid changes in 
American employment markets. Moreover, his optimism that the 
SSA can update the grids in a manner that will bring them into line 
with the modern economy is belied by Dubin’s descriptions of the 
SSA’s repeated failures to do so despite past efforts.226 Finally, 
Dubin’s narrow focus on the SSD system fails to acknowledge the 
broader inadequacies: 1) in our education system’s ability to 
prepare future workers for the modern economy; 2) in our social 
safety net for unemployed and displaced workers; and 3) in our 
lack of comprehensive national program of vocational and 
continuing education for disabled and displaced workers, and a 
system to assist such workers with transitional employment 
services. Even improved grids will not allow the SSD system, as 
currently constructed, to account for all of these failures. 
 Therefore, the Social Security Act should be amended to 
eliminate the vocational aspect of SSD determinations – the fourth 
and fifth steps of the sequential evaluation process.227 Thus, SSD 
claimants who are not engaged in SGA and who meet or equal a 
listing would be granted benefits, while all others would be 
                                                          
223 See Dubin, Issue Exhaustion, supra note 68, at 1289. 
224 See Dubin, Labor Market Side, supra note 33, at 1; Dubin, Overcoming 
Gridlock, supra note 134, at 937. 
225 Dubin, Labor Market Side, supra note 33, at 62. 
226 Id. at 38-47. 
227 A similar proposal was offered by the Reagan administration, but was never 
enacted. See Dubin, Labor Market Side, supra note 33, at 48.  
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denied.228 Note that while the SSD listings of impairments are 
much more current than the grids, they have not been updated for 
more than ten years in the case of physical disorders, and 15 years 
in the case of mental disorders.229 Certainly, the listings must be 
updated to reflect current medical understandings to the extent the 
listings become the final step in the SSD evaluation process. 
Updated listings hold out the promise of more accurate disability 
determinations in the future.230 
I do not intend to overstate the certainty and reliability of the 
medical aspects of disability determinations. While medical 
decisions based upon listings have an air of scientific realism, 
doctors and other scholars critiquing this issue assert that medical 
determinations of disability involve a host of discretionary and 
indeterminate factors.231 On the other hand, most would agree that 
the elements of discretion and uncertainty are even greater at the 
vocational stages of the sequential evaluation process.232 Yet over 
the past few decades, the number of initial allowances based on the 
Listings has plummeted, while the number of allowances based 
upon vocational factors has increased dramatically.233 William 
Morton, a research analyst who recently prepared a Congressional 
Research Service Report for Congress on the Growth of the SSDI 
rolls, attributes this to the outdated medical listings (even though 
the vocational data SSA relies on is even more outdated).234 In any 
event, greater reliance on updated medical listings will likely 
decrease uncertainty and indeterminacy of the system without 
entirely eliminating it. 
 Naturally, rendering those who would have been found 
disabled at the fourth and fifth stages of the sequential evaluation 
ineligible for benefits will greatly reduce those eligible to receive 
benefits, potentially solving the economic crisis that the SSD 
system currently faces. However, simply cutting off those who 
may have previously received benefits is not a humane way to 
solve the problem. Consistent with the values behind the ADA, 
those found not to be medically disqualified from work would need 
to be provided with a robust system of assistance that would 
include job training and placement services, supportive 
employment services where needed and cash assistance during the 
                                                          
228 I would impose this change prospectively, so no one who is currently 
receiving benefits, or who applied under the old system would have the new 
standard applied to them. 
229 Morton, supra note 62, at 28. 
230 Id. at 28-29. 
231 See Bloch, Medically Centered, supra note 134. 
232 Hubley, supra note 169, at 353. 
233 Morton, supra note 62, at 28. 
234 Id. 
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transition from unemployment to work.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The parallels between my proposal and the transition from the 
old AFDC program to the current TANF program seem evident. 
While “welfare reform” did result in dramatic reductions in 
welfare rolls, thus having positive immediate fiscal impact on 
government accounts, the broader goals of helping welfare 
recipients move from “welfare to work,” and therefore 
independence, do not seem to have been achieved.235 Limiting 
SSD to those who can meet a listing would certainly have the 
impact of reducing the rolls, and therefore address the fiscal and 
other public pressures on the system. However, it would only do so 
in a humane and socially responsible way if the vocational aspects 
of the system were replaced with a system of vocational training, 
rehabilitation and job placement services that effectively assist 
displaced workers in returning to the workforce, while also 
providing income support for those who are unable to do so despite 
good faith efforts. 
 Certainly, enacting a new major entitlement program of this 
scale is unlikely in the present political climate. However, as long 
as the SSD system is the only available social support for workers 
displaced by a combination of economic change and mental and 
physical limitations, the program will be stretched beyond its 
capacity to address compelling need beyond the scope of what the 
program was ever intended to address. 
                                                          
235 See e.g., Joel Berg, Welfare Reform: The Promise Unfulfilled, 11 J. GENDER, 
RACE & JUST. 47 (2007); Dubin, Labor Market Side, supra note 130, at 58 & 
n.243; Peter B. Edelman, Changing the Subject from Welfare to Poverty to a 
Living Income, 4 N.W. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 14, 18-23 (2009). 
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